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Essays on Asset Pricing and Downside Risk
Bruno Cara Giovannetti
This dissertation contributes to the recent and diverse literature on the relation
between downside risk and asset prices.
In chapter one, we use a famous quote among professional investors, "focus
on the downside, and the upside will take care of itself", to motivate a representative
consumer-investor who only cares about the downside. The consumption-based as-
set pricing model that emerges from this idea explains the main existing puzzles
found within the asset pricing literature. These include the equity premium and
the risk-free rate puzzles, the countercyclicality of the equity premium and the pro-
cyclicality of the risk-free rate. The model is parsimonious, requiring only three
preference-related parameters: the time discount factor, the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, and the downside risk aversion. When we use the model to un-
derstand the relation between returns and consumption in the US, we find that the
fitted parameter values are consistent with what is expected from the micro founda-
tions.
In chapter two, we show that the model proposed in chapter one can also ex-
plain the financial puzzles in other developed countries. This is an important step in
the empirical validation of the model. The estimated parameters are robust across
highly capitalized countries and qualitatively close to the ones obtained for the US.
Moreover, the risk measure under the quantile utility model can better justify the
differences in risk premia across countries when compared to the risk measure un-
der the expected utility model.
In chapter three, we evaluate the effect of margin requirements on asset prices,
an additional channel for the relation between downside risk and prices. We provide
evidences of the existence of an aggregate margin-related premium in the economy.
In particular, we show that (i) a margin-related factor is able to predict future ex-
cess returns of the S&P 500 and (ii) stocks with high betas on the margin-related
factor pay on average higher returns compared those with low margin betas. These
result are important not only to understand asset prices, but also the unconventional
polices implemented by the Fed during the great recession of 2007-2010. Although
data on margin requirements for the S&P 500 futures are publicly available, it is
in general very hard to obtain information on margins for other assets. Given that,
we also propose a nonparametric model for estimating margins as a function of the
asset’s value at risk. This is theoretically justifiable and has good empirical results.
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This dissertation contributes to the recent and diverse literature on the relation be-
tween downside risk and asset prices.
Distinct theoretical models have been developed to understand and formalize such a
relation. For example, Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997), Epstein and Zin (2001), Bar-
beris, Huang and Santos (2001), Ang, Bekart and Liu (2005) and Routledge and Zin (2010)
address some standard financial and macroeconomic puzzling facts employing asymmet-
ric preferences (agents somehow overweight bad outcomes when evaluating a risky situ-
ation). In a different framework, considering heterogeneous-risk-aversion agents facing
margin constraints, Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) demonstrate that margin requirements,
which are directly related to downside risk, may be relevant to determine prices (Brunner-
meier and Pedersen 2008, Gromb and Vayanos 2010 and Geanakoplos 2010 present similar
results). In addition, the disaster models constitute another example of the connection be-
tween asset prices and downside risk. Barro (2006) and Kelly (2009), in the same spirit
as Reitz (1988), show that the mere potential for infrequent extremely bad events can have
important effects on asset prices.1
The dissertation consists of essentially two parts, both of which are related to the
literature above. In the first part, developed in chapters one and two, we contribute to the
research on asset pricing under asymmetric preferences. In the second part, developed
1 As Donaldson and Mehra (2008) point out, asymmetric preferences models and disasters models can be
seen as dual to one another: either agents in the model must effectively be very sensitive to bad outcomes, or
it is the outcomes themselves that must be very bad.
ix
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in chapter three and co-authored with Guilherme B. Martins, we investigate the effect of
margins on asset prices.
In chapter one, we use a famous quote among professional investors, "focus on the
downside, and the upside will take care of itself", to motivate a representative consumer-
investor who only cares about the downside. The consumption-based asset pricing model
that emerges from this idea explains the main existing puzzles found within the asset pric-
ing literature. These include the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles, the counter-
cyclicality of the equity premium and the procyclicality of the risk-free rate. The model is
quite parsimonious, requiring only three preference-related parameters: the time discount
factor, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and the downside risk aversion. When
we use the model to understand the relation between returns and consumption in the US,
we find that the fitted parameter values are consistent with what is expected from the micro
foundations.
The parsimony of the model is a relevant characteristic. The good empirical results
from Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and Routledge and Zin (2010) indicate that the
consideration of asymmetric preferences over good and bad outcomes is a promising path
for theories on choices and, in particular, for a well-accepted resolution of the asset pricing
puzzles. Nevertheless, the large number of preference-related parameters in these models
(six and five, respectively), which is crucial for their success, is a delicate issue. First,
it is not easy to translate the models into a comprehensive view of the whole process.
Second, it is hard to assign precisely the corresponding importance of each parameter to the
obtained results. Finally, and perhaps most problematic, matching data by augmenting the
x
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parametric dimension is subject to the standard over-fitting critique. Given its parsimony,
the model developed in chapter one addresses all these issues.
Chapter two takes chapter one’s model to international data. As Campbell (1999,
2003) shows, the standard financial puzzles are also present in other developed countries.
Hence, we have an opportunity to submit our model to an additional test. Would it be suc-
cessful if confronted with an international data set? Chapter two presents evidences of a
positive answer to this question. By estimating the model for ten developed countries, we
obtain reasonable estimates for the risk and intertemporal preferences in general. The es-
timated parameters are robust across highly capitalized countries and qualitatively close
to the ones obtained for the US. We compare our results to Campbell’s (2003), who es-
timates the canonical expected utility model for the same countries. Moreover, we show
that the risk measure under the quantile utility model can better justify the differences in
risk premia across countries when compared to the risk measure under the expected utility
model.
The second part of the dissertation is developed in chapter three. As mentioned
above, a number of recent theoretical papers have been suggesting that margins can af-
fect asset prices in periods where risk tolerant agents are credit constrained.
The relation between margin requirements and downside risk is straightforward. When
an investor buys stocks on margin, some money is put up by him (initial margin), and the
remainder is borrowed from the broker, with the purchased shares used as collateral. How
does the broker define the maximum lending amount? According to the collateral evalu-
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ated at a worst-case scenario. Therefore, the worse the worst-case scenario, the higher the
initial margin requirement.
The result of margins affecting prices would be important not only to understand asset
prices per se, but also the unconventional credit policy implemented by the Fed during the
great recession of 2007-2010. The size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet has
suffered major changes in the past three years. In January 2007, the Fed carried no risk
of default in its assets, holding basically US Treasury bills ($ 780 billion). During the
crisis, however, a variety of asset were included in the balance sheet in significant amounts.
For example, commercial papers ($ 350 billion), repurchase agreements ($ 150 billion),
mortgage-backed securities ($ 1 trillion), Federal agency debt securities ($ 150 billion) and
others ($ 100 billion). In December 2010, the total size of the balance sheet was almost $
2.5 trillion.
As Geanakoplos (2010) points out, the negative effect of margins on prices, together
with the fact that these elements feed back one each other, could justify such a radical
change in the credit policy. According to him, during some periods, "the Fed must step
around the banks and lend directly to investors, at more generous collateral levels than the
private markets are willing to provide."
In addition, the margin premium may break the usual non arbitrage link between the
Fed fund rate and the rate of returns of other assets, affecting the ability of the monetary
authority to promote an expansionary policy. As we shall see in chapter three, the margin
premium is the product of the margin requirement, the cost of margin, and the importance of
the leveraged agents in aggregate consumption. The cost of margin is equal to the shadow
xii
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cost of capital, which can be measured by the difference between the uncollateralized and
the collateralized short term rates. The latter is closely related to the Fed fund rate, while
the former depends on the liquidity and credit condition in the interbank market. Hence,
during a financial crisis, when margin constraints are binding, a reduction in the Fed fund
rate may not translate into a fall on the rate of returns of other assets. The reason is that
the consequently higher shadow cost of capital steepens the margin-return relation, and this
increases the required return on assets with high margin requirements. Since in bad periods
margins are significantly higher across assets, the interest rate reduction can then have
small, zero, or even a positive effect on the required return of other assets in the economy.
Despite the importance of this result, empirical evidence is still scarce. Chapter
three contributes to fill this gap, finding empirical support for the existence of an aggre-
gate margin-related premium.
Our empirical findings are related to both the time-series and cross-section of returns.
In particular, we show that (i) a margin-related factor is able to predict the future excess
returns of the usual proxy for the market portfolio (S&P 500), and (ii) portfolios with high
betas on the margin factor pay on average higher returns in relation to those with low
margin betas.
Although data on margin requirements for the S&P 500 futures are publicly available,
it is in general very hard to obtain information on margins for other assets. Given that,
chapter three also proposes a nonparametric model for estimating margins as a function of
the asset’s value at risk. This is theoretically justifiable and has good empirical results.
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Chapter 1
Asset Pricing under Quantile Utility
Maximization
1.1 Introduction
A famous quote among professional investors is "Focus on the downside, and the upside
will take care of itself".2 In this paper, we consider a representative consumer-investor who
follows this advice. Surprisingly, the consumption-based asset pricing model that emerges
from this idea explains the main existing puzzles found within the asset pricing literature.
These include the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles, the countercyclicality of
the equity premium and the procyclicality of the risk-free rate.
In the proposed model, the consumer-investor is concerned with the so-called down-
side risk. This is done by replacing the standard setting of expected utility optimizing
agents with the concept of quantile utility. Under this framework, the agent summarizes a
risky situation using a worst-case scenario which is a function of his downside risk aversion.
The more downside risk averse the agent, the worse the worst-case scenario he considers.
The  quantile of a continuous random variable can be interpreted as the worst possible
outcome that can occur with probability 1   . Hence, instead of maximizing the expected
value of his utility function, the agent maximizes a given  quantile of it. As we will see, 
defines his downside risk aversion: the lower  ; the higher the downside risk aversion.3
2 A search of this sentence on the internet returns many results.
3 One could say that the agent’s objective function is given by the value at risk (VaR) of his utility. However,
1
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This is a novel extension of the static decision-theoretical framework developed by
Manski (1988) and Rostek (2010) for a dynamic asset pricing setting. In a standard econ-
omy with one risky and one risk-free asset, we can derive an arbitrage-free asset pric-
ing model, where both main characteristics of the canonical expected utility consumption-
based approach (Hansen and Singleton (1982), Mehra and Prescott (1985), hereinafter, the
canonical model) are modified. The equity premium is no longer based on the covariance
between the risky return and the consumption growth. Instead, it is a linear function of the
risky return standard deviation. In addition, risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS), which are linked throughout a single parameter in the canonical model,
are automatically disentangled in a simple way.
These two endogenous changes are the main drivers of the good empirical results.
Since stock returns historically have a high standard deviation, the price of such a risk, i.e.,
the level of downside risk aversion, will not have to be high to match the empirical excess
returns. Moreover, the attitude towards intertemporal substitution is not polluted by risk
preferences.
To reproduce (i) the first and second moments of the risk-free return, the equity pre-
mium, and the consumption growth, (ii) the low covariance between risky return and con-
sumption growth, (iii) the countercyclical risk premium, and (iv) the procyclical risk-free
rate that we see in data, our model requires only three parameters related to preferences: a
downside risk aversion () of about 0:43; an EIS ( ) of about 0:5 and a time discount fac-
tor () of less than 1: A downside risk aversion of such a magnitude is reasonable in that it
since  here is a free parameter defining preference towards risk, it is not restricted to being close to zero (as
in standard VaR applications).
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produces reasonable certainty equivalents for bets on continuously distributed random vari-
ables (stock indexes, for example). By comparing certainty equivalents under quantile and
expected utility maximization, an agent with this level of downside risk aversion is analo-
gous to an expected utility agent with a relative risk aversion coefficient of 3. According
to Mehra and Prescott (1985) reasonable values for such a parameter would be between 1
and 10. An EIS of about 0:5 is also an acceptable value. In a recent work using micro-
data, Engelhardt and Humar (2009) estimate the EIS to be 0:74, with a 95% confidence
interval that ranges from 0:37 to 1:21. Using macrodata and separating stockholders from
nonstockholders, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimates the EIS around 0:4 and 0:9 for these
respective groups.
To illustrate the main differences between the predictions of our framework and the
predictions of the canonical model, we first derive equations in closed-form for the risky
return, the risk-free rate, and the equity premium. These equations come from combining
the Euler equations of the quantile agent with the standard assumption of joint lognormality
of returns and consumption growth. In order to replicate the well-evidenced existence of
predictability in future excess returns, we then allow for time-varying economic uncertainty
in the aggregate economy dynamics. From this, a countercyclical risk premium and a
procyclical risk-free rate are produced.
Taking the model to data, we first perform simulation exercises, matching the first
and second moments of consumption growth, risk-free rate and excess returns. Then, to
evaluate the model free of distributional assumptions, we propose a GMM-based estimation
method for its parameters.
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The derived Euler equations impose restrictions on the functional forms of the con-
ditional  quantiles of consumption growth and excess return. They are well-defined func-
tions of the period-by-period risk-free rate and of the other parameters related to prefer-
ences. However, as  in this framework is not given (it is the downside risk aversion to
be estimated), the standard asymptotic results for quantile regressions as a GMM prob-
lem do not apply. Hence, we derive sufficient conditions for the parameters to be globally
identified and for the proposed estimator to be consistent.
The fact that the model separates risk and time preferences allows us to estimate the
EIS. This is a useful result of this paper. Under the standard technology for disentangling
EIS and risk aversion (Epstein and Zin’s (1989) preferences), one has to use instrumental
variables to estimate the EIS. This is what Hall (1988) and Campbell (2003) do for example.
Such estimations were recently found to suffer from weak-instruments related issues4 and
therefore are not reliable (see Neely, Roy, and Whiteman (2001) and Yogo (2004), for
instance). However, the EIS estimation under our model does not require the use of any
instrument.
We conclude the introduction by positioning this study in the related literature. The
research in asset pricing can be separated according to the modifications proposed with
respect to the canonical model. Such modifications are about (i) preferences, (ii) market
and asset structure, and (iii) the endowment process. Group (i) could be further divided
into two branches: (i.i) preferences inside and (i.ii) preferences outside the expected utility
4 To estimate the EIS under Epstein and Zin’s preferences one has to use instruments for consumption
growth or returns. Since both of these variables are only weakly predictable, the instruments are weak.
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framework. Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane (1997, 2006), Campbell (1999, 2003), and
Donaldson and Mehra (2008a, 2008b) provide good surveys of this literature.
The current study belongs to branch (i.ii), which was initiated by Epstein and Zin
(1989) and Weil (1989). These authors use the recursive preferences of Kreps and Porteus
(1978) as a way of separating time and risk preferences, something that is not possible
under the canonical model. By disentangling risk aversion and EIS, they end up with a
three-parameter model which is able to generate a reasonable level for the risk-free rate.
However, since no innovation in the risk dimension is made, a high level of risk aversion is
still necessary to fit the equity premium.
Epstein and Zin (1990, 2001) and Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997) investigate
the use of Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion preferences to explain the equity premium
puzzle.5 According to these preferences, outcomes below the certainty equivalent are over-
weighted relative to outcomes above it. Although such preferences are a one-parameter
extension of the expected utility framework, these papers extend the canonical model in
two parameters, since they also use the model of Epstein and Zin (1989) to disentangle risk
aversion and EIS. However, they are able to fit the equity premium with only a slightly
lower, still unreasonable, risk aversion level.6
Going further, Routledge and Zin (2010) extend the disappointment aversion model
in one additional dimension. They generalize Gul’s preferences by defining an outcome
5 Single-period portfolio allocation is studied under disappointment aversion by Ang, Bekart and Liu
(2005). Basset, Koenker and Kordas (2004) also study sinlge-period allocation using preferences that ac-
centuate the likelihood of the least favorable outcomes.
6 Bonomo and Garcia (1993) show that it is crucial to combine Gul’s preferences with a joint process for
consumption and dividends that follows a Markov switching model in order to match the first and second
moments of risk-free and excess returns under reasonable parameter values. However, a model such as that
would be in both groups (i.ii) and (iii) defined above.
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as disappointing only when it is sufficiently far (defined by the new parameter) from the
certainty equivalent. Since their model also separates risk aversion and EIS using Epstein
and Zin (1989) preferences, they are a three-parameter extension of the expected utility
model, resulting in a total of five preference-related parameters. Under this richer structure,
the disappointment aversion-based framework is finally able to address the financial puzzles
successfully.
An alternative way of considering the fact that people care asymmetrically about
good and bad outcomes is provided by the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). Applying prospect theory to asset pricing, Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) are
also able to reproduce the financial data patterns under reasonable parameter values.7 In
their model, the representative agent derives direct utility not only from consumption, but
also from changes in the value of his financial wealth. Moreover, he is more sensitive to
negative movements in his financial wealth than to positive movements. Besides that, such
a sensitivity also is a function of the agent’s past portfolio experience: if he had losses in
the past relative to a time-varying benchmark, he now is more sensitive to further losses. A
functional form reflecting this mechanism is imposed by the researchers.
Barberis, Huang and Santos’s (2001) model also employs a large number of preference-
related parameters; six, to be exact. The first two are the time discount factor and the rela-
tive risk aversion related to consumption. The third is the agent’s extra sensitivity to losses
in his portfolio wealth. The forth defines how previous losses impact the third parame-
ter. The fifth determines how the benchmark used by the agent to define gains and losses
7 Benartzi and Thaler (1995) investigate single-period portfolio allocation under prospect theory.
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evolves over time. The sixth controls the overall importance of utility from gains and losses
in financial wealth relative to utility from consumption.
The good empirical results from Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and Routledge
and Zin (2010) indicate that consideration of asymmetric preferences over good and bad
outcomes is a promising path for theories on choices and, in particular, for a well-accepted
resolution of the asset pricing puzzles. Nevertheless, the large number of preference-related
parameters in these models, which is crucial for their success, is a delicate issue. First,
it is not easy to translate the models into a comprehensive view of the whole process.
Second, it is hard to assign precisely the corresponding importance of each parameter to
the obtained results. Finally, and perhaps most problematic, matching data by augmenting
the parametric dimension is subject to the standard over-fitting critique. According to this
critique, the larger number of parameters may simply describe better the noise in the data,
rather than the underlying economic relationships. In other words, these models could be
providing spurious data-fitting.8
The present paper addresses these issues. The quantile utility criterion comes from
a loss-function that asymmetrically weighs good and bad outcomes, the well-known check
loss-function. Hence, the derived model under this framework belongs to the class of mod-
els related to asymmetric preferences. Moreover, the model is quite parsimonious, requir-
ing only three preference-related parameters: the time discount factor; the EIS; and the
8 This tense relationship between the augmentation of the expected utility framework with additional para-
meters and the over-fitting critique is raised, for instance, by Zin (2002). Based on that article, Watcher (2002)
claims that "behavioral models leave room for multiple degrees of freedom in the utility function. Taken to
an extreme, this approach could reduce structural modeling to a tautological, data-fitting exercise" and "I be-
lieve that parsimony lies at the root of what Zin refers to as reasonableness. A parsimonious model is a model
in which the number of phenomena to be explained is much greater than the number of free parameters."
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downside risk aversion. Finally, it solves the main asset pricing puzzles addressed by Bar-
beris, Huang and Santos (2001) and Routledge and Zin (2010).
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the quantile utility
agent in its general form and derives some basic results of asset pricing under quantile
maximization. Section 1.3 solves the model under lognormality and simulates from it.
Section 1.4 discusses how to estimate the model free of distributional assumptions and
presents the results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Quantile utility maximization and asset pricing
In this section, we first present the elements of the quantile utility model, following Manski
(1988) and Rostek (2010). Then, we apply this theoretical-decision framework to asset
pricing.
1.2.1 Elements
A general choice theory for quantile maximizing agents was developed recently. Rostek
(2010) is the first study to axiomatize the quantile utility agent. Notwithstanding, the quan-
tile maximization model for decision making under uncertainty was first proposed 22 years
ago by Manski (1988).
The main idea is simple. An agent, when facing a situation where he has to choose
among uncertain alternatives, picks the one that maximizes some given quantile of the
utility distribution instead of its mean, as in the expected utility model. In this framework,
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the agent cares about the worst outcome that can happen with a given probability. For
instance, the given quantile can be the median of the utility distribution, or the 0.25 quantile.
In the case of the 0.25 quantile for example, when evaluating an uncertain situation, he
looks at the worst outcome that can occur with 75 percent probability (i.e., the chance of
the realized scenario being better than the scenario he considers is 75 percent).
The quantile of concern is an intuitive measure of pessimism. If agent A looks at
the worst that may happen in 90 percent of the situations, i.e., quantile 0.10, and agent B
looks at the worst that may happen in 60 percent of the situations, i.e., quantile 0.40, we
would naturally classify agent B as more optimistic than agent A : agent A picks a more
conservative scenario to summarize the lottery. Figure 1.1 illustrates this for a lottery that
follows a normal distribution.
Fig. 1.1. The quantile utility agent’s reasoning.
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As we shall see below, the quantile of concern defines also the agent’s downside risk
preference. Hence, downside risk preference is closely related to our standard notion of
optimism-pessimism.
(i) Asymmetric preference
Because of the characteristics of his loss-function, we can say that the quantile agent
cares asymmetrically about good and bad outcomes. This intuition comes from Manski
(1988), based on the work of Wald (1937).
Assume that an agent has to evaluate an uncertain situation where U is his utility level
which can have different values in different states of the world. This uncertain situation is
represented by the cumulative distribution function of U; denoted by FU : According to
the standard framework in decision theory introduced by Wald (1937), this agent should
summarize (evaluate) FU using the criterion ! that minimizes the expected value of his
loss-function, i.e., his risk-function.
A possible loss-function could be the square loss. In this case, he would summarize
FU using








z dFU (z) :
Hence, he would use the expected utility criterion of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
and Savage (1954): This allows us to interpret the expected utility agent as someone who
is evenly worried with underpredictions and overpredictions of his utility level in a risky
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situation and uses squares (L2 norm) to compute the distances between the utility level
predictions and realizations.
What if the decision maker was asymmetrically worried about under and overpre-
dictions of his future utility level? We could describe a situation like that by the check
loss-function of Koenker and Basset (1978). In this case, he would evaluate FU using




(1  ) jz   !j  1 [z < !] +  jz   !j  1 [z  !] dFU (z)
= Q (U) ;
where Q (U) is the  th quantile of the random variable U (if FU is continuous, Q (U) =
F 1U ()):
Therefore, a quantile maximizer can be described as someone who asymmetrically
weighs underpredictions and overpredictions of his future utility level, in the ratio (1  ) = ;
and uses absolute values (L1 norm) to compute the distances.9 In this case, the agent’s eval-
uation criterion is the  th quantile of his utility, that is, the worst possible utility level that
may happen with probability (1  ): This is the optimal criterion to summarize FU given
his asymmetric concern with the upper tails of utility distributions relative to their lower
tails.
9 Such an agent could also compute distances under the L2 norm. In this case, his criterion to evaluate FU
would be the expectiles of Newey and Powell (1987)





E [(U   ! ()) 1 [U < ! ()]] :
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(ii) Quantile agent definition
We now define the quantile agent in a more formal way. Let S be a set of states of the
world s 2 S; and X be an arbitrary set of payoffs x; y 2 X :Then, the agent has to choose
among simple acts h : S ! X ; which map from states to payoffs. Let A be the set of all
such acts, and E = 2S be the set of all events. Define  to be a probability measure on
E; and u a utility function over payoffs u : X ! R: For each act,  induces a probability
distribution over payoffs, referred to as a lottery. Given that, let G;H denote the random
variables (payoffs) induced by the acts g; h 2 A, respectively. Finally, define FG and FH
as the lotteries induced by the acts g and h, i.e., the cumulative distribution functions of G
and H , respectively.
A decision maker is defined as a  -quantile maximizer if there exists a unique  2
[0; 1] ; a probability measure  on E; and a utility function u, such that for all g; h 2 A;
g  h, Q (u (G)) > Q (u (H)) :
As always, we can think in terms of the lotteries:
FG  FH , Q (u (G))  Q (u (H)) :
(iii) Downside risk aversion
For the standard expected utility agent, we may understand risk preferences using the
following logic.
First we define riskiness. We say that the lottery FH is riskier than the lottery FG if
FG second-order stochastic dominates10 (SSD) FH (see Rothschield and Stiglitz (1970)).
10 FG SSD FH if and only if
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Then, we define  to be the class of all pairs of lotteries that SSD one another, i.e.,  =
f(FG; FH) : FG SSD FHg: It is natural to classify agent A as more risk averse than agent B
if for all pairs of distributions in ; whenever B prefers a distribution which SSD the other,
so does A: Finally, we show that this will be the case if and only if the utility function of
agent A is "more concave" than the utility function of agent B, i.e., uA (x) =  (uB (x)) ;
where  () is an increasing concave function. Given that, we conclude that risk-aversion
is described by the concavity of the utility function.
Manski (1988) and Rostek (2010) follow the same logic to attach the quantile maxi-
mizer’s attitude toward risk to the quantile he maximizes. The central point is that riskiness
is characterized in a different way, the so-called downside risk: FH involves more down-
side risk than FG if FG crosses FH from below. We say that lottery FG crosses lottery
FH from below if there exists x; y 2 X ; such that FG (y)  FH (y) for all y < x and
FG (y)  FH (y) for all y > x. That is, downside risk is related to the probability of bad
outcomes.11
Just as above, considering the class of all pairs of lotteries with the single-crossing
property,  = f(FG; FH) : FG crosses FH from belowg; we say that individual A is more
downside risk averse than individual B if, for all pairs of distributions in ; whenever B
prefers a distribution which crosses the other from below, so does A: Given that, we can
show that agent A is more downside risk averse than agent B if and only if A < B; and
Z x
 1
[FH (t)  FG (t)] dt  0, for any x 2 X :
11 If FG and FH have the same mean, and FH has more downside risk than FG; then FH has also more
(second-order stochastic dominance) risk than FG: However, under different means, this is not true.
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then  can be defined as the downside risk aversion parameter in the decision model: the
lower  ; the more downside risk averse the agent.
But what role does the concavity of the utility function play under this framework?
Because of the property of equivariance of quantiles to monotonic transformations, the
answer to this question is "none", at least for static decision problems.
(iv) Equivariance of quantiles to monotonic transformations
A key aspect of the quantile utility model is that static decisions are invariant to any
strictly increasing transformation of the utility function. This is described in Proposition 1
in Manski (1988).
If m : R! R is a strictly increasing function, and X is a random variable; then12
Q (m (X)) = m (Q (X)) : (1.1)
Hence, for lotteries FG and FH ;
FG  FH , Q (u (G))  Q (u (H))
, u 1 (Q (u (G)))  u 1 (Q (u (H)))
, Q (G)  Q (H) ;
where the second line follows from the fact that u is a strictly increasing function.
12 The intution under this result is that a strictly increasing transformation of the random variables doesn’t
change the order of the values of their support.
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Therefore, for static problems, the agent’s decision does not depend on u. Manski
(1988) and Rostek (2010) refer to this as a robustness property: the choice is unaffected by
misspecification of the utility function.
However, the utility function is relevant in intertemporal choices. When the utility
function has more than one argument, it is not possible to use the equivariance property
to get rid of u. In particular, under time-separability, the concavity of the utility function
defines the preference towards intertemporal substitution as usual: This is going to play an
important role in the asset pricing theory, allowing the downside risk aversion and the EIS
to be disentangled. This idea is not in Manski (1988) or in Rostek (2010) and, to the best
of our knowledge, is explored for the first time in the present study.
1.2.2 Asset pricing
We now apply the quantile maximization decision theory to the standard intertemporal
problem of a consumer-investor agent. First, we define the consumption-investment prob-
lem and solve for the Euler equations that the agent must respect in equilibrium. Then we
discuss the Law of One Price and the no-arbitrage condition under this framework.
The model to be considered has 2 periods. As Karni and Schmeidler (1991) show,
once we depart from expected utility, one of the following three assumptions has to be
relaxed: (i) time consistency; (ii) consequentialism; or, (iii) reduction of compounded lot-
teries. Assumptions (i) and (ii) are in the heart of the Principle of Optimality of dynamic
programming (see Rust (2006), section 3.6). Therefore, to be able to solve a multiple-
period problem outside of the expected utility framework by standard dynamic program-
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ming, one must relax assumption (iii). However, by relaxing (iii), one would be including
preferences about the time of resolution of the uncertainty in the model, just as in the re-
cursive preferences of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989).13 Since the
central goal of this study is to develop a simple, parsimonious and stylized model to ad-
dress the over-fitting critique within the asymmetric preferences literature, we restrict the
model to a 2-period framework.
The economy has two assets, one risky and one risk-free. Define the value of the
risky asset at t+ 1 to be Xt+1 = Pt+1 +Dt+1; where Pt+1 is the price of the asset at t+ 1
and Dt+1 is the value of some cash flow the investor received between t and t + 1 (in the
case of a stock, D is the dividend). DefineXft+1 to be the value of the risk-free asset at t+1
and P ft its price at t: Let Ct be the agent’s consumption at t;  and f be the quantity of
the risky and risk-free assets he buys at t respectively, and Wt be his initial wealth. Then,
under time-separability, he solves:
Max
;f2R2
Qt (u (Ct) + u (Ct+1)) (1.2)
s:t: Ct = Wt   Pt   P ft f




where  is the time discount factor, u is the utility function, Qt (x) is the  th quantile of
the conditional distribution of the random variable x (conditional on the information set
available at time t):
13 Indeed, according to Rust (2006), recursive preference is the only class of non-expected utility preferences
that allows the use of standard dynammic programming (backward induction) to solve multi-period problems.
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This agent derives utility only from consumption, as usual, and cares about the worst
outcome (in terms of the utility for both periods) that may occur with probability (1  ) :
In other words, this agent follows the famous advice "Focus on the downside, and the
upside will take care of itself". As discussed in sub-section 1.2.1, the higher his level of
downside risk aversion, the lower  .
A key feature of problem (1.2) is that downside risk aversion and elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution (EIS) are automatically disentangled. This is a direct consequence
of the quantile’s equivariance for monotonic transformations. Note that, according to equa-
tion (1.1), we have
Qt (u (Ct) + u (Ct+1))
= u (Ct) + u (Q

t (Ct+1)) ;
since u is a strictly increasing function.
Hence, all uncertainty in problem (1.2) is resolved by parameter  , since Qt (Ct+1)
is deterministic at t: The only role played by u is to discount consumption across time:
depending on the concavity of u; the agent will combine present consumption, Ct; and the
certainty equivalent of future consumption (which, for the quantile maximizer, is equal to
Qt (Ct+1)): Hence, the concavity of u will only define the EIS, denoted by  : Specializing
u (c) = c
1  1




14 Note that such an assumption for the functional form of
u imposes no restriction on risk preference: it simply restricts the EIS to being constant.
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The EIS parameter,  = 1

; defines the degree of substitutability-complementarity
between consumption today, Ct; and the certainty equivalent of consumption tomorrow,
Qt (Ct+1) : For  ! 0; Ct and Qt (Ct+1) become perfect complements, and we have the
agent’s object function given by
U (Ct; Q

t (Ct+1)) = min fCt; Qt (Ct+1)g :




t (Ct+1)) = Ct + Q

t (Ct+1) :
For the intermediate case of  = 1; we end up with the Cobb-Douglas
U (Ct; Q





With respect to the time discount factor ; its role is to determine the marginal rate of
substitution between Ct and Qt (Ct+1). Therefore,  defines the degree of substitutability-
complementarity between Ct and Qt (Ct+1) ; and  parameterizes such a relation.15
What are the implications of the quantile maximization asset pricing model? With















15 On the empirical side, we will see that both parameters are also separately identified by our estimation
method.
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Proposition 1 Suppose a consumer-investor solves problem (1.2) and u (c) = c1  1
1  .

















From now to the end of section 1.3, we study the asset pricing implications of equa-
tions (1.3) and (1.4). The first step is to understand whether they respect the Law of One
Price and the no-arbitrage condition. Then, we solve the model under the standard assump-
tion of joint lognormality for returns and consumption growth, deriving closed-forms for
the risky return, the risk-free rate and the equity premium in equilibrium.
Since we ignore transaction costs, any candidate for an equilibrium pricing system





to be a portfolio formed at t; with price given by Pt , the pricing system has to




t : Otherwise, Pt and P
f
t cannot be equilibrium prices because of
arbitrage opportunities among the individual assets and the portfolio. Equations (1.3) and

















































where the second line follows from the quantile equivariance. Note that for a degenerate





As is well-known, a linear pricing system does not completely rule out arbitrage
opportunities. Hence, we need to impose two mild conditions to end up with an arbitrage-
free model.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (i) the risky asset payoff Xt+1 is a continuous random vari-
able and (ii)  2 (0; 1) : Then, the pricing model given by equations (1.3) and (1.4) rules
out arbitrage opportunities.
Both conditions of proposition 2 (proved in the appendix) are reasonable. The conti-
nuity of the risky asset payoff comes for free for stock prices. The second condition, more
subtle, rules out two well known agents in decision theory, the so-called MaxMin and Max-
Max. The MaxMin agent ( = 0) summarizes a lottery by looking at the very worst case
scenario that may take place (that is, the worst case scenario that may occur with probabil-
ity 1). On the other hand, the MaxMax ( = 1) summarizes a lottery by looking at the very
best case scenario that may take place (or, in other words, the worst case scenario that may
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occur with probability 0). Since both agents represent extreme behaviors (the extremely
pessimistic and the extremely optimistic), excluding them is not a restrictive assumption.
1.3 Dynamics, model solution and simulation
We now solve the model in closed-form, under joint lognormality of returns and consump-
tion growth, with both constant and fluctuating economic uncertainty.
Although the solution under constant economic uncertainty is enough to match both
the risk-free rate and the risk premium under reasonable levels for the preference-related
parameters, it does not generate a time-varying risk premium. To improve the model in
this direction, we allow stochastic volatility in the economy dynamics. The model is then
simulated under this richer environment.
1.3.1 Dynamics 1: constant economic uncertainty
Assume













Under this framework, the closed-forms for the risky return, the risk-free rate and the
equity premium are given by the following proposition.
1.3 Dynamics, model solution and simulation 22
Proposition 3 If returns and consumption growth are jointly lognormally distributed, fol-
lowing (1.5), and the pricing system is given by equations (1.3) and (1.4), then
rt+1 =   log () + c +  1 () (c   r) + ut+1 (1.6)





=  r 1 () (1.8)
where rft+1 refers to the risk-free asset return and  1 is the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
To gain intuition on equations (1.7) and (1.8), it is useful to compare them to the
analogous equations from the canonical expected utility model. As first derived by Hansen
and Singleton (1983), it is well-known that under expected utility maximization and log-
normality of returns and consumption growth we have











2r + cr: (1.10)
We first focus on the predictions for the risk-free return. First, in both models, the
risk-free rate is linear in expected consumption growth with the slope equal to the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The lower the EIS (i.e., the higher the desire for
consumption smoothing across time), the higher the risk-free rate. This effect is increasing
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in the expected consumption growth, meaning that the agent will be less willing to save if
he expects tomorrow’s consumption to be higher.
Second, also common to both models, the higher the rate at which the agent discounts
future utility (the lower ); the higher the risk-free rate he requires in order to save.
Third, and this is a first novelty of the quantile approach, a higher variability of
consumption growth may have either positive or negative effects on the level of the risk-
free rate under the quantile model. If  > 0:5, a high standard deviation of consumption
growth generates a high risk-free rate. If  < 0:5; a high standard deviation of consumption
growth generates a low risk-free rate. The intuition for this is clear: if the agent is optimistic
( > 0:5), a higher variability is interpreted by him as a higher chance of getting a high
level of consumption tomorrow and hence, he becomes less willing to save (higher risk-
free rate). In the case of pessimism ( < 0:5), a higher variability is interpreted as a higher
chance of getting a low level of consumption tomorrow, which leads the agent to save more
(lower risk-free rate). The strength of this effect, as expected, is increasing in the desire of
smoothing consumption across time ().
The separation of intertemporal and risk preferences under the quantile model be-
comes evident when we compare the third terms of equations (1.7) and (1.9). In equation
(1.9), we have 2; where one  stands for the risk aversion and the other  is the inverse
of the EIS. In equation (1.7), we have the product between the inverse of the EIS and a
function of the downside risk aversion.
We now turn to the equity premium equation (1.8). The risk premium does not depend
on the covariance between consumption and stock returns as in the canonical model but,
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instead, on the standard deviation of the stock return.16 A higher standard deviation may
require either a higher or a lower expected return, depending again on whether  is greater
or less than 0:5. The intuition is the same as above: under optimism ( > 0:5); a high
variability is interpreted as a high chance of getting good returns which, therefore, increases
prices (decreasing expected returns). Under pessimism ( < 0:5) a high variability means
a high chance of getting bad returns which causes prices to decrease (increasing expected
returns).
These differences imply a better performance of the quantile model when taken to
data. Because risk and time preferences are now disentangled we have degrees of freedom
to fit both the risk-free rate and the equity premium (just as in Epstein and Zin (1989)).
Moreover, the source of risk has now changed. Under expected utility, the covariance
between consumption and risky return is the source of risk. This is empirically low, gen-
erating the necessity of a high risk aversion to match the equity premium. However, under
quantile utility, risk is determined by the standard deviation of the risky return. This value
is high in data and, therefore, we attenuate the role of the downside risk aversion.
Yearly US data on consumption and returns ranging from 1889 to 2009 can be found
on Professor Robert Shiller’s website.17 The risky and risk-free returns are from the S&P
500 and 1-year treasury bill, respectively. The series for per capita consumption are based
on the NIPA and NBER series of consumption.
16 The variance term that shows up in equation (1.10) is simply a Jensen’s inequality adjustment (since the
expression is about log returns). All that matters for the difference between the risky and the risk-free returns
is the covariance term.
17 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm, as in November 2010.
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According to this data set, the average real stock log return has exceeded the average
treasury bills log return in about 5 percent per year in the post-war period. Stock log return
has had a standard deviation about 17 percent per year, and the covariance between stock
log return and per capita log consumption growth has been about 0.2 percent. Inserting
these values into equation (1.10) and solving for ; we have  = 32: Hence, in order to fit
these patterns of the data, the canonical model requires a risk aversion coefficient that is
too high (equity premium puzzle).
But let us suppose one is willing to accept  = 32: Then we run into the risk-free
rate puzzle. The per capita log consumption growth series has presented annual mean and
standard deviation of about 2.1 and 2.2 percent, respectively. The risk-free log return has
been about 1.4 percent. Calibrating equation (1.9) with these values and solving for the
time discount factor (), we have an absurd  = 1:59 (it is unreasonable to assume that
people prefer later utility).
Doing the same exercise using the quantile model equations, we first impose the left
hand side of (1.8) to be 5 percent and the standard deviation of the risky log return to be 17
percent. Solving for  ; we have  = 0:38: So, in order to fit the equity premium, the agent
has to care about the worst that may happen with probability 62 percent. At a first glance,
this does not seem to be a high degree of pessimism. We soon will return to this point.
To compute the time discount factor () necessary to fit the observable risk-free rate
we should calibrate equation (1.7) with empirically acceptable values for the EIS.18 In a re-
cent work using microdata, Engelhardt and Humar (2009) estimate the EIS to be 0:74, with
18 When estimating the model, we will be able to separably identify the discount factor and the EIS.
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a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0:37 to 1:21. By differentiating between stock-
holders and nonstockholders and using macrodata, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimates the
EIS to be around 0:4 and 0:9; respectively. Given that, we use  = 1:5 (i.e., EIS equal to
0:67).19
Calibrating equation (1.7) with rft+1 = 1%; c = 1:9%;  = 0:36, c = 0:021
and  = 1:5; and solving for ; we have  = 1:007; which is much better than 1:46.
By increasing rft+1 to 2%, we have  = 0:997; a qualitatively acceptable value (2% is
reasonable number for the average risk-free rate as well).
1.3.2 Dynamics 2: stochastic economic uncertainty
A limitation of the quantile model presented so far is that it does not generate a time-varying
equity premium (or a time-varying risk-free rate). Because of that, the model cannot the-
oretically explain two well documented empirical facts: the existence of excess returns
predictability and countercyclical risk premia.20 Since a significant part of the current lit-
erature on consumption-based asset pricing addresses matching time variation in expected
returns, it is important to improve the quantile model in this direction.
One possible way of doing that is to incorporate fluctuating economic uncertainty
into the model. Bansal and Yaron (2004) provide empirical evidence that justifies such
19 All of these estimates are obtained under the expected utility framework. Even though the EIS has nothing
to do with risk, one could conjecture that if the true model is related to quantile maximization, such estimates
might be biased, which would complicate the calibration of  under the quantile model: However, the forth-
coming estimates for the EIS that I obtain under the quantile model (which, as we will see, are separably
identified from the discount factor) are around these values as well.
20 See Fama and French (1989), Ludvigson and Ng (2007) and Cooper and Priestley (2009), for instance,
on the countercyclicality of the risk premium.
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a modification. Bansal, Khatchatrian and Yaron (2002) extensively document that a time-
varying consumption volatility holds up quite well across different samples and economies.
Therefore, we now assume the following dynamics for the real economy:
gt+1 = c + tt+1 (1.11)
rt+1 = r;t + 'tut+1 (1.12)











The stochastic volatility fluctuates around ; and  represents how quickly it gets
pulled toward its mean. The evidence in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal, Khatchatrian
and Yaron (2002) are of slow-moving fluctuations in economic uncertainty, implying a 
close to one. The conditional variances of consumption growth and return are now given
by 2t and '22t ; respectively, and the conditional covariance between consumption growth
and return is now '2tcr:
Solving for r;t; the next proposition shows that returns and risk premium are now
time-variant.
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Proposition 4 Under the dynamics defined in equations (1.11), (1.12) and (1.13) and the
Euler equations (1.3) and (1.4) we have:
rt+1 =   ln  + c + (   ')t 1 () + 'tut+1 (1.14)





=  't 1 () (1.16)
If  < 0:5 (the pessimistic agent, as discussed in the previous subsection), periods
with higher economic uncertainty are periods with higher demand for saving, and hence,
lower risk-free rate. This effect is increasing in the desire for consumption smoothing
; the inverse of the EIS. Moreover, more economic uncertainty raises the risk premium,
and this effect is increasing in ' - the parameter that links economic uncertainty to return
uncertainty. Therefore, the time-variation goes in the (theoretically-) intuitive direction.
As Bansal and Yaron (2004) claim, consumption and market volatilities are high
during recessions. Given that, the risk premium in equation (1.16) is countercyclical.21 In
addition, equation (1.15) implies a procyclical risk-free rate, in line with data as well.
Simulation
We now simulate from this model to better visualize its asset pricing implications.
We simulate first the economic uncertainty from equation (1.13) and then feed equations
(1.11), (1.14) and (1.15) with this series. As in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Barberis,
Huang and Santos (2001), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal, Kiku and Yaron (2009) and
many others, we assume that the decision interval of the agent is monthly but the targeted
21 The counter-cyclical feature of the risk premium in the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004)
also comes from the presence of the stochastic volatility in the risk-premium equation.
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data to match are annual. Therefore, we simulate at the monthly frequency and aggregate
to annual data.
The stochastic volatility structure added to the model is identical to the one consid-
ered in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal, Kiku and Yaron (2009), and we calibrate
parameters (; ; v) with the same values of this last paper.22 With respect to (c; cr) ;
they are set in accordance the sample mean of the consumption growth and the sample
covariance between consumption growth and risky return, respectively.
Given such values, we choose the free parameters ('; ;  ; ) seeking to match the
first and second moments of the risk-free rate and excess return, and the second moment of
consumption growth. Table 1.1 summarizes the parameters’ optimal choices.
parameters for monthly simulation value
α (mean of economic uncertainty) 0.00722
σv (standard deviation of log economic uncertainty) 0.28 x 10
-5
ρ (log economic uncertainty persistence) 0.999
μc (mean consumption log growth) 0.0018
σcr (covariance between η and u) 0.5
ϕ (adjustment of the log return standard deviation) 5.5
β (discount factor) 0.9998
EIS (inverse of γ) 0.6
τ (downside risk aversion) 0.45
Table 1.1. Configuration of the model parameters for simulation.
22 Equation (1.13) produces a small number (about 5%) of negative values for 2t ; as in Bansal and Yaron
(2004) and Bansal, Kiku and Yaron (2009). Following them, I replace these negative values with the smallest
positive value generated for 2t : Obviously, one could model log(2t ) to get rid of this technical problem (but,
in this case, it wouldn’t be possible to follow their calibration).
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The preference-related parameters (;  ; ) are close to those from the previous sub-
section. The time discount factor () is slightly below one, the EIS of 0:6 implies  = 1:66,
and the downside risk aversion is now even smaller with  = 0:45:23
Table 1.2 presents the impacts on the simulated moments of varying both the risk
aversion and EIS. The other parameters are kept fixed in accordance with Table 1.1.
τ EIS E(r-rf) σ(r) E(rf) σ(rf) E(g) σ(g) cov(g,r)
0.41 0.1 10.0 15.8 3.5 11.2 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.41 0.6 10.0 15.6 0.8 1.9 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.41 1.1 10.0 15.9 0.5 1.0 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.45 0.1 5.5 15.3 11.7 6.2 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.45 0.6 5.5 15.3 2.1 1.1 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.45 1.1 5.5 15.3 1.2 0.6 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.49 0.1 1.0 15.0 19.8 1.2 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.49 0.6 1.0 15.0 3.5 0.2 2.1 2.7 0.2
0.49 1.1 1.0 15.0 2.0 0.1 2.1 2.7 0.2
4.8 16.8 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.2 0.2
(1.5) (1.8) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.0)
other parameters values: following Table 1.1
data
s.e.
Table 1.2. Simulated moments.
From Table 1.2 we see three effects: (i) higher values of downside risk aversion (i.e.,
lower values of ) increase the mean excess return; (ii) lower values for EIS increase the
mean risk-risk free return and its volatility; and, (iii) decreasing  also impacts the mean
and standard deviation of the risk-free rate, decreasing the former and increasing the latter.
23 Importantly, the quantile model does not need an EIS greater than one to produce good empirical results.
This is relevant when compared to Bansal and Yaron (2004). For them, it is crucial for the good results to
employ an EIS greater than one, more precisely, equal to 1.5 (and this value is not empirically reasonable, as
discussed before.)
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The theoretical reasons for the effects related to the first moments are the same as
those under constant economic uncertainty. A higher downside risk aversion implies a
higher price for the risk, and therefore, a higher risk premium, justifying effect (i). A higher
complementarity between consumption at t and the certainty equivalent of consumption at
t + 1 implies a higher desire to smooth consumption in time, and therefore, a higher risk-
free rate to justify savings from t to t + 1, which explains effect (ii). Finally, a higher
downside risk aversion leads to more savings from period t to period t+ 1 for a given level
of economic uncertainty at t; lowering the risk-free rate and justifying (iii):
With respect to the effects related to the second moment of the risk-free rate, the
theoretical explanations are the following. The effect in (ii) comes from the natural fact
that the volatility of the risk-free rate is a function of the volatility of the economic uncer-
tainty which is decreasing in the EIS (see equation (1.15)). This makes theoretical sense,
since savings should respond more to economic uncertainty, the more the agent cares about
smoothing consumption. The reasoning supporting the effect in (iii) follows the same line:
the more downside risk averse the agent, the more savings should respond to economic
uncertainty.
We therefore conclude that the quantile asset pricing model’s predictions are theo-
retically solid. In addition, when calibrated with empirically reasonable parameters and
 = 0:45; the model is able to reproduce important patterns of financial and macroeco-
nomic data. At this point, a natural question is: how reasonable is  = 0:45?
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1.3.3 What is a reasonable value for  ?
Is  = 0:45 more reasonable than  = 35 (the value obtained in sub-section 1.3.1 for
the risk aversion under expected utility and lognormality) in terms of the implied attitude
towards risk? Or, what is a reasonable range for ?
One way to evaluate  is to compare the certainty equivalent implicit in a quantile
model to the one implicit in a power utility model for risky situations with payoffs following
continuous distributions, in accordance with Proposition 2.
Using certainty equivalents of simple bets to relate parameters from different models
of behavior towards risk is a standard procedure in this literature. For instance, Epstein
and Zin (1990) use such a strategy to compare the risk aversion levels in Yaari preferences
with the risk aversion levels in the expected utility preferences (see their Tables 1 and 2).
Bonomo and Garcia (1993), Epstein and Zin (2001), Routledge and Zin (2010), among
others, do the same.
A simple and natural risky situation to use is the following. Suppose the agent wants
to invest $1000 and the investment return follows the same distribution considered in (1.5).
Therefore,
ln (Xt+1)  N
 





where, as usual, Xt+1 is the value of the investment at t+ 1.
For a one-year investment, the sample estimates for r and 2r are about 0.08 and 0.03
respectively. The initial investment value is immaterial for the forthcoming conclusions.
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We can first ask: what are the certainty equivalents for a quantile agent with  = 0:45
and for an expected power utility agent with  = 35 for this uncertain outcome Xt+1?
For an expected utility agent with power utility, the certainty equivalent of a lottery








For a  -quantile utility agent, the value of a lottery with payoff x is equal toQ [u (x)] :




Figure 1.2 presents the histogram of the uncertain investment value at t + 1, which
has mean and standard deviation around $1103 and $212, respectively. The vertical dashed
lines are the certainty equivalents for the power utility agent with  = 35 and for the
quantile agent with  = 0:45 (they are around $643 and $1057, respectively).
A casual review of this figure suggests that the certainty equivalent of a power utility
agent with  = 35 is too small compared to what one would expect as reasonable. On
the other hand, for a quantile agent with  = 0:45; his certainty equivalent looks much
better. However, it is already well-known in the literature that  = 35 generates extreme
outcomes in an expected utility setting. So, one can argue that basically any alternative
utility specification is going to behave more reasonably. Considering that, perhaps a clearer,
more illustrative way to proceed would be to ask: which value of  would give the certainty
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Fig. 1.2. Histogram of uncertain payoff and certainty equivalents for  = 35 and  = 0:45:
equivalent obtained with  = 0:45? The answer is  = 2:5: In other words, in terms of
certainty equivalents, a quantile utility agent with  = 0:45 would be analogous to an
expected utility agent with  = 2:5; a value which is commonly referred to as reasonable
in the literature.
Pursuing this idea further, we can relate many values of  to many values of  in
terms of producing the same certainty equivalent for the bet defined above. Figure 1.3
presents this relationship.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that acceptable values for  would be between 1
and 10. Hence, for the risky situation considered, the analogous interval for  would be
[0:22; 0:48] :
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Fig. 1.3. Values of  and  that produce the same certainty equivalent in the bet defined
above.
1.3.4 Comparing results
So far we have compared our results only to those from the canonical model. This was
done to illustrate the new features of the present approach with respect to the predictions
for the risk-free rate and the equity premium.
In this sub-section we briefly compare the results obtained to those of Epstein and Zin
(1989) and Weil (1989) (three parameters), Bonomo and Garcia (1993) (four parameters)
and Routledge and Zin (2010) (five parameters), and Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001)
(six parameters).
By using recursive preferences, Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) disentangle
risk aversion and EIS and still have the time discount rate - the same parameters we have
here. By doing so, they are able to fit both the equity premium and the risk-free rate.
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However, the extremely high risk aversion remains crucial. As Table 1 in Weil (1989)
shows, in order to match the average of risk-free and excess returns, risk aversion and EIS
have to be set at 45 and 0:1, respectively. If risk aversion is decreased to 1, the premium
is as low as 0.45 percent, while the mean risk-free rate reaches 25 percent. Furthermore,
nothing is said about second moments.
With one extra parameter compared to our model (the one that regulates the disap-
pointment aversion), the model in Bonomo and Garcia (1993) under a joint random walk
for consumption and dividend growth rates24 produces an average equity premium on the
order of 2.5 percent with standard deviation about 12.8 percent. The risk-free rate averages
about 4.5 percent. This is the best they are able to get using what they consider reasonable
values for their parameters.
By adding one more parameter to the disappointment aversion model, Routledge
and Zin (2010) are able to generate good results with this framework. By means of a
countercyclical risk aversion (produced by an endogenous variation in the probability of
disappointment), they produce a large equity premium (about 6 percent) and a risk-free
rate with low volatility and mean. However, they still have difficulty with fitting the risky
return volatility and maintaining the 6 percent equity premium at the same time.
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) assume a functional form for preferences based
on prospect theory, which has 6 parameters. Their model succeeds in explaining the first
and second moments of the risk-free rate, the equity premium and the consumption growth,
24 Comparable to the dynamics I use here.
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and produces a time-varying risk premium (that comes from the impact of the agent’s past
portfolio result on his sensitivity for future losses).
1.4 Model estimation
The previous section presented the quantile utility asset pricing model under the assump-
tion of joint conditional lognormality of asset returns and consumption growth. This was
useful for building intuition with respect to the model. However, it is well-known that the
lognormality assumption is not consistent with all the properties of historical stock returns.
For example, stock log returns show weak evidence of skewness and strong evidence of
excess kurtosis, at least for short horizons. Hence, it is important to understand how the
model performs if we relax the lognormality assumption.
In this section, we discuss how to estimate the model free of distributional assump-
tions. A GMM-based estimator is proposed, the identification of the parameters is ana-
lyzed, and sufficient conditions for consistency are established. Moreover, since the pro-
posed estimator is defined over non-differentiable moments, its asymptotic distribution is
derived.
In the appendix, we also estimate the model under the lognormality assumption. This
complements the simulation exercise performed in section 1.3 by providing confidence
bands to the parameters.
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1.4.1 A general estimation method
The estimation of ;  and  free of any distributional assumption will be performed by
combining GMM and quantile regression’s elements. However, since  ; the respective
conditional quantile, also has to be estimated, the present problem is distinct from the
standard quantile regression, where  is taken as given.
In the case of the canonical expected utility model, the standard way of estimating
the model free of distributional assumptions is by applying the GMM of Hansen (1982), as
was first proposed by Hansen and Singleton (1982). This is straightforward since it is just a
matter of transforming conditional into unconditional expectations. However, this is not the
case if we want to estimate the quantile Euler equations (1.3) and (1.4). There is nothing
analogous to the law of iterated expectations for quantiles. Moreover, equations (1.3) and
(1.4) are not even moment conditions. But, as we see now, it is possible to overcome such
difficulties in a simple fashion.
Let the vector 0 = ( 0; 0;  0) represent the populational values for the down-







and let Y  fYt : 
  ! R+  R; t = 1; :::; Tg be a stochastic process
defined on a complete probability space (
;F ; P ) ; where F  fFt : t = 1; :::; Tg and
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Rt+1 = Q
0 (Rt+1jFt) + "r;t+1: (1.18)
Given this structure, we first note that the asset pricing theory imposes functional
forms on the conditional quantiles defined above. From Proposition 1, the risky and risk-


















Rft+1 = 1: (1.20)
where we now use the EIS parameter  0 instead of its inverse 0.
By dividing equation (1.19) with equation (1.20) we get
Q0 (Rt+1jFt) = Rft+1: (1.21)














Hence, the theoretical model imposes that, in equilibrium, all the information that
matters for the conditional quantiles of Rt+1 and Ct+1=Ct is Rft+1 (which is already known
at t; i.e., Rft+1 2 Ft). More than that, the model defines the whole functional form of such
conditional quantiles.
Given (1.21) and (1.22), we can state the following proposition.
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Proposition 5 Let Zt be an m 1 vector such that Zt 2 Ft : Define






















where 1 [] is the logical indicator function.
Then,
E [g (Yt+1; Zt; 0) jFt] = 0: (1.23)
Therefore, we have 2m moment conditions and 3 parameters to be estimated. For
m  2 we may use Hansen’s (1982) GMM approach;















g (Yt+1; Zt; )
!
(1.24)
where WT is a general weighting matrix.
Even though the interpretation of a quantile regression as a GMM problem is stan-
dard, we cannot directly use the established asymptotic results (from Koenker and Basset
(1978) and Powell (1984, 1896), for example). In quantile regressions,  0 is a given number
and not a parameter to be estimated. Hence, the fact that our central task is the estimation
of  0 places this econometric problem in a new environment.
We have to understand whether the GMM estimation of 0 is indeed feasible. In
other words, we have to understand whether 0 is identified and derive the consistency
and asymptotic distribution of b. Fortunately, as we see now, we can conclude under mild
conditions that 0 is globally identified and b is consistent and asymptotically normal.
The following proposition presents sufficient conditions for consistency.
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and -mixing of size r= (r   1), with r > 1; (ii) E kZtk <1; where kk denotes the L1-
norm, (iii)   R3 is a compact set (iv) WT p! W0; where W0 is a positive definite matrix,










Then, b p! 0; where b is defined in equation (1.24).
Assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) are technical and often present. Assumption (iv) is sat-
isfied by a special choice for WT ; as Proposition 7 will show. Assumption (v) is standard
in quantile regressions and natural for aggregate consumption growth. Assumption (vi)
simply says that the instrument set should include a constant and the risk-free rate. As-
sumption (vii) is a standard rank condition which requires the explanatory variable to be
non-degenerate. Assumptions (v), (vi) and (vii) are the crucial ones for global identifica-
tion, as can be seen in the proof (in the appendix).
The proof of Proposition 6 shows that E [g (Vt+1; )] = 0 if and only if  = 0: By
combining this with the fact that W0 is positive definite, we conclude that the populational
object-function of our GMM estimator has a unique optimum at  = 0; that is, 0 is
globally identified.25
The global identification of the parameters can be seen as a fortunate achievement
of the present model. In fact, according to Newey and McFadden (1994), "If E [g (z; )]
25 Lemma 2.3 in Newey and McFadden (1994) shows that ifW0 is positive semi-definite andW0E (g (Vt+1; )) =
0 ,  = 0; then the populational GMM object-function is uniquely minimized at  = 0: However, as it
is trivial to show, if W0 is positive definite, one only needs E (g (Vt+1; )) = 0 ,  = 0 to get the same
result.
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is nonlinear in , then specifying primitive conditions for identification becomes quite dif-
ficult ... A practical solution to the problem of global GMM identification, that has often
been adopted, is to simply assume identification. This practice is reasonable, given the
difficulty of formulating primitive conditions, but it is important to check that it is not a
vacuous assumption whenever possible, by showing identification in some special cases."
For instance, as Newey and McFadden (1994) points out, in the canonical model of Hansen
and Singleton (1982) it is possible to derive global identification only under a particular
form of the conditional distribution.
Proposition 7 now proposes a specific choice for WT :
Proposition 7 Suppose that assumption (i) holds, assumption (ii) is strengthened to (ii’)
there exists some  > 0 such that E kZtk2r+2 and additionally assume (viii)  0 2 (0; 1),









Vt+1;e g Vt+1;e0! 1 ; (1.25)







g (Vt+1; 0) g (Vt+1; 0)
0
is positive definite.
As usual, estimator e may be computed in a first step by b; with WT as the identity
matrix (according to Proposition 6): Assumption (viii) rules out the MaxMin and Max-
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Max agents from the analysis, which had already been done to ensure no-arbitrage in the
model. Hence, such agents are not only incompatible with no-arbitrage, but also may
jeopardize the identification of the model. Assumption (ix) is also a mild one. First,
note that under independence of "c;t+1 and "r;t+1; defined in equations (1.17) and (1.18),
P ("c;t+1  0; "r;t+1  0jZt) =  20; and this is satisfied: Hence, this assumption is about
"c;t+1 and "r;t+1 not being too positively correlated. But, note that in the extreme case of
positive correlation, where "c;t+1 = "r;t+1; we have P ("c;t+1  0; "r;t+1  0jZt) =  0:
Therefore, imposing P ("c;t+1  0; "r;t+1  0jZt) <  0 is not restrictive at all. Assumption
(x) is the usual rank condition on the instruments.
Note that Proposition 5 implies that fg (Yt+1; Zt; 0) ;Ftg is a martingale difference
sequence. Consequently, g (Yt+1; Zt; 0) is not serially correlated, and 0 defined in propo-
sition 7 is the asymptotic variance of the moment conditions.
We now turn to the asymptotic distribution of b: To address the nondifferentiabil-
ity of g () ; we use the empirical processes theory approach presented in Andrews (1994)
which, under some regularity conditions, replaces the differentiability of g () by the dif-
ferentiability of E [g ()] : The next proposition derives the asymptotic distribution of the
estimator.
Proposition 8 Suppose all assumptions of Proposition 6 hold, where assumption (ii) is
strengthened to (ii’) of Proposition 7: Furthermore, assume that (xi) f"c;t+1 (0jZt) is bounded
away from zero, and (xii) the matrixG00W0G0 is nonsingular, whereG0  rE (g (Vt+1; 0))
is a 2m 3 matrix with entries
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Gi1 = E (Zit)






















Gj1 = E (Zjt)
Gj2 = 0
Gj3 = 0




b   0 d! N 0; (G00W0G0) 1G00W00W0G0 (G00W0G0) 1 :
Assumption (xi) is standard in quantile regressions, and rules out having zero in
the denominator. Assumption (xii) implies the existence of the term (G00W0G0) 1 in the
asymptotic variance. Proposition 8 tells us that the usual GMM asymptotic distribution for
differentiable moments conditions is valid for our nondifferentiable specific case as well.
This implies that the optimal choice for WT is the one that converges in probability to
 10 ; which is the weighting matrix defined in Proposition 7. The optimal weighting matrix
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1.4.2 A simple two-step estimation procedure
Functions such as (1.24) are difficult to optimize by the standard packages algorithms (fmin-
search, in MATLAB, or nlm and optim in R, for instance): they are nonsmooth and highly
nonconvex, with numerous local optima. However, as we have only 3 parameters with well
defined theoretical bounds (such as  0 2 [01; :99] ; 0 2 [0:9; 1:1] and  0 2 [0; 5]), the
optimization is feasible using a grid search in our case.
Nevertheless, it is useful to note that 0 can be consistently estimated in an even sim-
pler manner, using a two-step procedure. Such an estimator is not going to be efficient,
but this discussion builds intuition into the model and provides a rapid and simple technol-
ogy for estimating, for instance, the EIS (the estimation of the EIS under Epstein and Zin
(1989) preferences, the alternative technology of disentangling risk and time preferences,
is much more involving).
In a first step, we estimate  0. Equation (1.21) implies
E
h



















which is the relative number of observations in the sample such that Rt+1 < Rft+1: From
standard arguments, its asymptotic distribution is given by
p
T (e    0) d! N (0;  0 (1   0)) :
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Given e , we can now estimate (0;  0) by a standard linear quantile regression. This
is the case since, by the equivariance property of quantiles, equation (1.22) implies
Q0 (gt+1jFt) = 0 +  0rft+1; (1.27)




and 0 =  0 log (0) :
The only drawback of using e instead of  0 in equation (1.27) is the usual problem
with standard errors of the second step. As is well-known, they have to be corrected because
of the noise produced in the first-step estimation. However, in practice, this implies no
additional computational cost for our two-step procedure. In standard quantile regressions,
the coefficients’ asymptotic variance contains the unknown conditional distribution of the
error term. Because of that it is common to compute standard errors by bootstrap. Hence,
to address the two-step estimation issue, it is natural to incorporate the first step in the
bootstrap procedure.26
From
b; b  one consistently computes b = expb=b  : The standard error of

















where 2 is the asymptotic variance of b; 2 is the asymptotic variance of b ; and  is
the asymptotic covariance between both estimators.
26 That is, from S bootstrapped samples one estimates S pairs
b; b  and computes their empirical variance
matrix.
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1.4.3 Empirical results
We now apply the estimation procedures discussed above to a monthly data set. Such
data frequency is used to maintain the assumption that the decision interval of the agent
is monthly, as in the simulation exercise. Percapta consumption is the sum of personal
consumption expenditures on services (PCES, St. Louis Fed) and personal consumption
expenditures on nondurable goods (PCEND, St. Louis Fed), divided by the total population
(POP, St. Louis Fed). The risky return is the S&P 500 return including dividend payments,
and the risk-free return is the 1-month risk-free rate series from Professor Fama located
in the CRSP data base. All series are deflated by the consumer price index for all urban
consumers (CPIAUCSL, St. Louis Fed). Since both consumption series start in January
1959 in the St. Louis Fed data base, the data set ranges from January 1959 to December
2009.





















; all three satisfying assumption (vi) in Proposition 6. We
do not include lags of consumption growth and risky returns since they have very weak
forecasting power over their future realizations (see Cochrane (2006), pp 268).
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 1.3 present the estimates of 0 under the general (one-
step) estimation method. Standard errors are analytically computed using the asymptotic
distribution derived in Proposition 8.27 The fifth column of Table 1.3 shows the result from
the two-step procedure presented in the last sub-section: Standard errors are calculated by
27 We estimate f"c;t+1 (0jZt) nonparametrically, following Powell (1986), usingb"c;t+1 = Ct+1Ct  b0Rft+1b :
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bootstrap according to the previous sub-section, addressing both issues of  0 estimated in
a previous step and of the unknown distribution in the asymptotic variance.
Table 1.4 reproduces Table 3, but allows for the presence of auto-correlation in the
empirical moments. In columns 2, 3 and 4, WT is computed by Newey and West’s (1987)




block 1 Z(1) Z(2) Z(3)
β 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002
(se) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0001)
EIS 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.39
(se) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
τ 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43
(se) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
J stat. 5.1 7.2 10.3
(p-value) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
1-step procedure
Columns 2, 3 and 4 present the 1-step estimates. Z (j) contains up to the j-th lag of the
risk-free rate. Column 5 presents the 2-step estimates. For all columns, no serial-
correlation is assumed, justified by the fact that moments are martingale difference
sequences according to proposition 5.
Table 1.3. Estimates under no serial-correlation
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2-step procedure
block 1 Z(1) Z(2) Z(3)
β 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002
(se) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001)
EIS 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.39
(se) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
τ 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.43
(se) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
J stat. 3.8 4.9 9.7
(p-value) (0.05) (0.18) (0.08)
Columns 2, 3 and 4 present the 1-step estimates. Z (j) contains up to the j-th lag of the
risk-free rate. Column 5 presents the 2-step estimates. Serial-correlation is allowed for
all columns and asymptotic variance is estimated by Newey-West with 6 lags (columns
2, 3 and 4) and by overlapping block-bootstrap with 6 lags (column 5).
1-step procedure
Table 1.4. Estimates under serial-correlation
The estimates from Tables 1.3 and 1.4 are very similar. This should be a conse-
quence of the very low empirical serial correlation of consumption growth and returns.
The estimates across columns in both tables are also very similar, which is evidence of the
robustness of the estimation methods. In particular, the results from the one-step and the
two-step procedures are very close to each other. This was expected since both procedures
are consistent.
Although the time discount factor estimates are slightly above one, it is in general not
possible to reject the hypothesis 0 < 1. The estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution go from 0:35 to 0:39 and are all significantly different from zero: The downside
risk aversion is estimated ranging from 0:43 to 0:45 and are all significantly different from
0:5:
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The EIS estimation under an alternative framework is a contribution of the present
paper. As discussed in Guvenen (2006), most of the estimated Euler equations deliver ex-
tremely low values for such a parameter, often not significantly different from zero. How-
ever, macroeconomists calibrate their models using positive values for the EIS, generally
between 0:5 and 1. Hence, the present results diminish this contradiction between the dy-
namic macroeconomics literature and the Euler-equations-based estimates for the EIS.
With respect to the model specification, the overidentifying restrictions test rejects
the model at 5% only in the first column of Table 1.3. This is a remarkable result given the
usual rejection of asset prices models by the J-test.
Since these results from estimation are qualitatively the same as those obtained under
simulation (the time discount factor used in the simulation exercise was 0:9998; the EIS
was 0:6 and the downside risk aversion was 0:45); we conclude that such values are robust.
1.5 Conclusion
We considered a framework where the representative agent makes his decision about consumption-
investment looking at worst-case scenarios, which depend on his degree of pessimism. We
used a well-known quote among professional investors to motivate this agent: "Focus on
the downside, and the upside will take care of itself".
Under the quantile utility maximizer agent of Manski (1988) and Rostek (2010), we
attached the agent’s degree of pessimism to a well defined parameter. As a consequence,
we disentangled attitude towards risk and attitude towards intertemporal substitution in a
novel way.
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Two important results emerged. First, with only 3 preference-related parameters, the
model was able to reproduce the historical averages and volatilities of the excess return,
risk-free rare and consumption growth, the low covariance between stock return and con-
sumption growth, the countercyclicality of the risk premium, and the procyclicality of the
risk-free rate. Second, it was possible to estimate the EIS from an Euler equation in which
such a parameter was separably identified. Related to the second result, a novel and simple
two-step estimation procedure for the EIS was proposed.
The developed model was restricted to a single risky asset and a risk-free security.
This was enough to address the proposed questions. Because of the nonlinearity of the
quantile operator, the derived Euler equations cannot be directly generalized to more than
one risky asset. Hence, a quantile asset pricing model with multiple risky assets, to study
the cross-section of returns, is an interesting topic for future research.
A pure quantile maximizer agent is probably not a good representation for general
behavior towards risk. Given that, the present model should be understood as a stylized and
parsimonious study within the class of models that use asymmetric preferences over good
and bad outcomes (as in prospect theory and disappointment aversion). As such, it makes
an important contribution to the literature. Given its ability to explain the financial puzzles
parsimoniously, it (i) offers a simpler view regarding the relationship between asymmetric
preferences and financial data, and (ii) provides evidence that the good empirical results
obtained by the studies employing asymmetric preferences are not due to over-fitting.
Chapter 2
International Data and the Quantile Utility
Asset Pricing Model
2.1 Introduction
The asset pricing model proposed in chapter one considers an investor who only cares about
downside risk. As we saw, the model can address the financial puzzles related to the first
and second moments of risky and risk-free returns and consumption growth for the US.
According to Campbell (1999, 2003), the US stylized facts described in the previous
chapter also apply to international data. For example, excess returns are high and covari-
ances between risky returns and consumption are low (even negative). As a consequence,
the canonical expected utility model also faces serious difficulties when confronted with
such data, that is, the financial puzzles are a robust phenomenon in international data.
Given that, an important step in the empirical validation of the quantile utility model
is to check whether it can explain the relation between returns and consumption in other
developed countries. As we present in this chapter, this seems to be the case.
The fact of having data available for more than one country allows us to perform
an interesting exercise. A major difference between the quantile model and the canonical
expected utility approach is the idea of risk. Under expected utility, the agent is worried
about smoothing consumption across states of the world. As a consequence, risk is given
by the covariance between return and consumption. The quantile utility agent, however,
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cares about how bad he is going to be when a bad state occurs. In this case, risk can be
shown to be about the standard deviation of the investment return. Accordingly, we can
examine which definition of risk can better explain the differences in excess returns across
countries, considering that risk aversion levels do not vary much from country to country.
This is the first empirical analysis of this chapter. The conclusion is clear. On the
one hand, since the covariance between risky return and consumption growth is negatively
related to the mean excess return, the expected utility model cannot explain why different
countries pay different mean excess returns without imposing a very large variation in the
risk aversion levels across countries. On the other hand, the standard deviation of return
has no clear relation to the mean excess return. Hence, the differences in risk premia may
be easier justified by smaller differences in the levels of risk aversion.
We then compute the parameters of the quantile utility model for each country. We
do that by first imposing joint lognormality of returns and consumption growth. Following,
we estimate the model free of any distributional assumption. In both exercises we obtain
reasonable values for the preference-related parameters, namely, the time discount factor,
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and the downside risk aversion. The dis-
count factor is in general below 1, the EIS between 0 and 1, and the downside risk aversion
between 0.30 and 0.45. These results lead us to conclude that the success of the model in
explaining the financial puzzles in the US also holds internationally.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the international
data set and discusses the risk-return trade-off across countries, section 2.3 performs the
main empirical analysis and section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 International data
Campbell (1999, 2003) reviews the behavior of stock prices in relation to consumption
using international data. His goal is to see which features of the US experience apply more
generally.
To construct an international quarterly data set, he uses Morgan Stanley Capital Inter-
national (MSCI) stock market data covering the period since 1970. He combines the MSCI
data with macroeconomic data on consumption, interest rates, and the price level from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund.
The latest version of such a data set (the one used in Campbell 2003) contains the fol-
lowing countries: Australia (1970 to 1998), Canada (1970 to 1998), France (1970 to 1998),
Germany (1972 to 1998), Italy (1971 to 1998), Japan (1970 to 1998), the Netherlands (1977
to 1998), Sweden (1970 to 1998), Switzerland (1975 to 1998), and United Kingdom (1970
to 1998).
The main data set used here is the same one used in Campbell (2003). This has
two reasons. The first is that we can directly compare the present results with Campbell’s
(2003). The second is the implementation of the EuroZone (EZ) in 1999.
The euro was designed to help build a single market by easing travel of citizens and
goods, eliminating exchange rate problems, providing price transparency, creating a sin-
gle financial market, and providing a currency used internationally and protected against
shocks by the large amount of internal trade within the EZ. Hence, since 1999, the in-
vestment in stock markets and treasury bonds was greatly facilitated across EZ members.
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Because of that, imposing that investors of the Netherlands, for instance, can only invest in
their home stock market and treasury bonds is not a reasonable assumption from 1999 on.
Nevertheless, we construct an updated version of Campbell (2003) data set for the
countries outside the EZ (Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK),
with series up to 2009, and present the estimates using these data as well.
As Campbell (2003) highlights, different national stock markets are of very different
sizes, both absolutely and in proportion to national GDP’s (capitalization ratio). In the
UK and Switzerland, for example, the capitalization ratio was about 80% during the 90’s,
whereas in Germany and Italy it was less than 20%. This is a relevant issue, because of
the theoretical convention of treating the stock market as a claim to total consumption, or
as a proxy for the aggregate wealth of an economy. Moreover, according to La Porta et al
(1997), stock ownership also tends to be much more concentrated in the countries with low
capitalization.
Because of that, empirical tests of asset pricing theories using aggregate data make
much more sense in highly capitalized countries. With that in mind, in what follows, we
draw our main conclusions from such countries’ results.
Table 2.5 reports summary statistics concerning returns and consumption for each
country. The statistics are the mean and the standard deviation of the (annualized and real)
risky and risk-free log returns and consumption log growth, and the covariance between
risky log returns and consumption log growth. Countries are ordered according to their
capitalization ratio.
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country capitalization * E(r) σ(r) E(rf) σ(rf) E(c) σ(c) cov(r,c)
Switzerland 88% 13.7% 21.8% 1.4% 1.5% 0.5% 2.1% -0.12%
United Kingdom 80% 8.2% 21.2% 1.3% 3.0% 2.2% 2.5% 0.12%
Netherlands 46% 14.1% 17.2% 3.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.6% 0.02%
Australia 42% 3.5% 22.7% 2.0% 2.5% 2.1% 2.1% 0.16%
Japan 40% 4.7% 21.9% 1.4% 2.3% 3.2% 2.6% 0.11%
Sweden 36% 10.6% 23.8% 2.0% 2.8% 1.0% 1.9% 0.03%
Canada 31% 5.4% 17.3% 2.7% 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 0.19%
France 22% 9.0% 23.4% 2.7% 1.8% 1.2% 2.9% -0.10%
Germany 17% 9.8% 20.1% 3.2% 1.2% 1.7% 2.4% 0.03%
Italy 9% 3.2% 27.0% 2.4% 2.9% 2.2% 1.7% -0.03%
data up to 1998 (Campbell 2003)
* size of stock market (market value) over GDP in 1993
Table 2.5. International descriptive statistics
For all countries in Table 2.5, the mean risky return exceeds the mean risk-free rate
as expected. However, the difference between them, that is, the mean excess return, is
quite variable. It goes from 0.8% (Italy) to 13.7% (Switzerland). Can this difference in
mean excess returns be justified by the difference in the risk levels across countries? For
example, is Switzerland much riskier than Italy or Australia?
The risk-return trade-off across countries
The equilibrium expected excess return is in general given by the product between
the size of risk and the risk price (risk aversion level). This is the case for the canonical
expected utility model and the quantile utility model, as we see in equation (1.8) and (1.10)
in chapter one. Hence, if the risk aversion levels don’t vary much across countries (or vary
in a way unrelated to the risk levels), we should see a positive relation between risk and
excess returns in a cross-section of countries.
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Under the canonical expected utility model, risk is about the covariance between
risky return and consumption growth. If we plot these covariances and the excess returns
computed for each country, we have a rather frustrating evidence for the expected utility
framework. As Figure 2.4 shows, there is a negative relation between risk under expected
utility and mean excess return.
Fig. 2.4. Mean excess return X risk under expected utility.
Although it is true that the countries’ risk aversion levels may be different, this would
hardly justify the relation we see in Figure 2.4. Countries with higher risk would have
to have extremely lower risk aversion to compensate for the lower mean excess return.
Moreover, the fact that some countries (Switzerland and France) have negative covariance
and high mean excess returns would remain puzzling.
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If countries with low capitalization ratio (below 30%) are excluded from Figure 2.4,
things get even worse. The negative relation between risk and mean excess return becomes
stronger (the t-statistic of the regression line’s slope is  6:7). Figure 2.5 presents this plot.
Fig. 2.5. Mean excess return X risk under expected utility (countries with capitalization
ratio greater than 30%).
Using the information in Table 2.5, we can submit the quantile asset pricing model
to the same basic test. We construct the same plots but using the standard deviation of the
risky return as the risk factor. Figures 2.6 shows that there is no strong relation between
mean excess return and risk across countries.
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Fig. 2.6. Mean excess return X risk under quantile utility.
Because of Italy’s location in the plot, the relation is still slightly negative. However,
Italy is the country with the lowest capitalization ratio (9%) and, as discussed above, may
be not a good empirical counterpart of the theoretical model. Figure 2.7 considers only the
countries with capitalization ratio above 30%.
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Fig. 2.7. Mean excess return X risk under quantile utility (high capitalized countries).
Figure 2.7 makes the lack of relation between mean excess return and risky return
standard deviation clearer (the t-statistic of the regression line is  0:09). Although the
lack of relation does not provide direct support to the quantile utility model, it also does
not reject the model per se. Here, smaller differences in the downside risk aversion levels
across countries would enough to justify the differences in mean excess returns, as we see
in the next section.
2.3 Fitting the model to each country
We first calibrate equations (1.7) and (1.8) from chapter one with the values from Table
2.5, and solve for the preference related parameters  (the EIS, the inverse of ) and  . We
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first solve for  in equation (1.8) and then, fixing  = 0:999; solve for  in equation (1.7).
Table 2.6 presents the results.
country downside risk aversion (τ) EIS (ψ)
Switzerland 29% -0.5









the EIS values were obtained by fixing the discount factor ( β) at 0.999
Table 2.6. International parameters under lognormality
The estimates for the downside risk aversion range from 27% (Netherlands) to 49%
(Italy). If we consider only the countries with capitalization ratio above 30%, the maximum
 is 47%.
Such values of  belong to the acceptable interval 22%   48% discussed in chapter
one. This implies that in order to explain the excess returns across countries, one would
need a quantile asset pricing model with reasonable levels of downside risk aversion.
This is in sharp contrast with the results from the canonical expected utility model.
Table 4 in Campbell (2003) provides the values for each country’s risk aversion computed
from the closed-form equation for the risk premium under expected utility. For Switzer-
land, France and Italy (the countries with negative covariance between risky return con-
sumption growth) risk aversion levels are negative and, for all other countries, unreason-
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ably high. Moreover, as suggested from the discussion in the previous section, they present
a extremely large variation across countries. Table 2.7 reproduces those values.











from Table 4 in Campbell (2003)
Table 2.7. International risk aversion under expected utility
We now turn to the EIS. Although the EIS is a key parameter that plays a crucial role
in policy and welfare assessments, the empirical literature involving it is far from a mature
stage. On the one hand, the estimates that come from aggregate data and Epstein and
Zin (1989) preferences (Hall 1988, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Campbell 2003, for
example) usually find very small, most of the times not even significant, values, for both the
US and other developed countries.28 On the other hand, macroeconomists usually calibrate
their models using positive values for the EIS, generally between 0:5 and 1. Positive values
are also found by some studies using microdata. For instance, Engelhardt and Humar
(2009) estimate its 95% confidence interval to be 0:37  1:21 (for the US).
28 However, the standard procedure that has been employed in the EIS estimation since Hall (1988) was
recently found to suffer from weak instruments. See Neely, Roy, and Whiteman (2001) and Campbell (2003).
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The EIS values presented in Table 2.6 are in general consistent with those numbers,
except for Switzerland ( 0:5) and Japan (2:2). However, since we were not able to sepa-
rably identify the two time-preference parameters,  and  , it can be the case these results
are not precise: As mentioned above, we first fixed  and then solved equation (1.7) for  :
In other words, we could only identify  as a function of ; and the EIS values in Table 2.6
will not be accurate in case  is different from 0:999.
In next section, throughout the full estimation of the model, we overcome this issue
and present the most reliable results for this important parameter.
2.3.1 Model estimation
We now estimate the model for each country using both the one- and the two-step proce-
dures proposed in chapter one.29 As chapter one shows, under mild regularity condition,
the one-step estimator globally identifies (;  ; ), is consistent, and has a standard limiting
distribution. Moreover, it does not depend on any distributional assumption. The two-step
estimator, although not efficient, is a simple robustness check for the estimates, since it is
also consistent. Table 2.8 reproduces the obtained results.
29 In the one-step procedure we use one lag of the risk-free rate as the instrument. As in chapter one, adding
more lags changes the estimates very slightly.
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Country cap. ratio β ψ τ J-test stat. β ψ τ
Switzerland 87% 0.995 0.35 0.36 1.7 0.995 0.43 0.36
(0.005) (0.17) (0.05) (0.0004) (0.22) (0.05)
United Kingdom 79% 0.999 0.41 0.36 0.2 0.999 0.42 0.36
(0.005) (0.11) (0.05) (0.0004) (0.12) (0.05)
Netherlands 46% 0.986 0.58 0.31 1.9 0.985 0.45 0.31
(0.005) (0.23) (0.04) (0.0006) (0.20) (0.05)
Australia 42% 1.037 0.08 0.46 0.1 1.043 0.06 0.45
(0.053) (0.09) (0.04) (0.0101) (0.14) (0.04)
Japan 40% 1.006 0.55 0.42 1.7 1.006 0.54 0.42
(0.004) (0.13) (0.04) (0.0007) (0.26) (0.04)
Sweden 36% 0.974 0.91 0.39 0.01 0.973 0.87 0.39
(0.003) (0.12) (0.05) (0.0004) (0.14) (0.05)
Canada 31% 1.003 0.17 0.42 2.5 1.006 0.13 0.42
(0.014) (0.14) (0.04) (0.0018) (0.12) (0.04)
France 22% 1.072 0.05 0.41 0.8 1.102 0.04 0.41
(0.260) (0.16) (0.04) (0.0323) (0.11) (0.04)
Germany 17% 0.997 0.36 0.39 0.1 0.997 0.35 0.39
(0.005) (0.21) (0.05) (0.0005) (0.17) (0.05)
Italy 9% 1.255 0.04 0.58 4.61 1.28 0.03 0.52
(0.586) (0.08) (0.05) (0.1045) (0.09) (0.05)
J-test critical values: 6.63 (1%) and  3.84 (5%)
heteroskedasticy and serial correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis
2-step1-step
Table 2.8. International estimated parameters
We base our discussion on the one-step estimator results, given its efficiency and the
fact that it allows us to perform specification tests. Note however that, as in chapter one,
the two-step procedure produces very close estimates for the parameters.
With respect to the discount factor ; its 95% confidence interval contains values
below 1 for all countries. In other words, it is not possible to reject at 95% of confidence
that, in each country, the representative agent prefers earlier utility. More than that, for
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (the most capitalized countries), the
estimate of  is below 1.
The EIS estimates are reasonable values as well. Among the countries with capi-
talization ration above 30%, only Australia and Canada present insignificant estimates for
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the parameter. This would imply that, in these countries, present and future consumption
are perfect complements. However, in Switzerland, the UK, the Netherlands, Japan and
Sweden, the representative agent is willing to substitute consumption across time, as the
positive EIS indicates.
Regarding the downside risk aversion of countries with capitalization ration above
30%, the estimates range from 0.31 (Netherlands) to 0.46 (Australia). These are reasonable
values in accordance to chapter one. We can compare the estimates for  with the values
obtained for it in the previous sub-section. The differences are not higher than 3%, except
for Switzerland, 7%, and Sweden, 6% (for these two countries the lognormality assumption
is probably more binding).
The overidentifying restrictions tests do not reject the hypothesis that the model is
correct at 5% for all countries other than Italy, the one with the lowest capitalization ratio.
As expected, the model works much better for the countries with not too low capital-
ization ratios (above 30%). Based on the results, it is fair to say that the theoretical model
is empirically successful for these countries. As we see now, the conclusion is the same for
the updated data set.
2.3.2 Updated data set
We construct an updated data set for the countries that do not belong to the Euro Zone.
These are Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. The updated data set is
also quarterly and ranges from 1970 to 2009. As a general rule, we use the same sources
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used by Campbell (2003). All stock market and macroeconomic series are denominated in
local currency units.
The source for stock market data is Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI).
Quarterly returns are based on the quarterly MSCI National Gross Returns Indices, calcu-
lated with dividends reinvestment before withholding taxes have been paid.
The main source for the macroeconomic data is the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Interest rates quarterly series were constructed from
monthly series, considering the last month of the quarter. We used treasury bill rates for
Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and UK and money market rates for Australia and Japan. Re-
garding consumption, for each country a quarterly series on seasonally adjusted aggregate
private consumption was obtained from IFS, and transformed into percapta consumption.
Population, also from IFS, was only available in the annual frequency. Hence, we con-
structed quarterly population series by assuming that population grows at constant rates
within the year. Returns and consumption growth were deflated using quarterly CPI for
each country series also from IFS.
Table 2.9 presents the updated descriptive statistics.
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country E(r) σ(r) E(rf) σ(rf) E(c) σ(c) cov(r,c)
Switzerland 7.7% 23.2% 1.2% 1.4% 0.7% 1.1% 0.02%
United Kingdom 5.3% 25.1% 1.7% 3.9% 2.1% 2.6% -0.03%
Australia 4.9% 22.8% 2.7% 4.2% 1.8% 1.6% -0.06%
Japan 3.5% 26.2% 1.2% 3.1% 1.7% 2.9% 0.30%
Sweden 8.7% 27.7% 2.1% 3.6% 2.3% 3.0% 0.30%
Canada 5.4% 17.8% 2.4% 2.9% 1.8% 2.2% 0.12%
Table 2.9. Updated international descriptive statistics
If we update the plots from section 2.2 using the information of Table 2.9, both ex-
pected and quantile utility models benefit. The strange negative relation between risk and
return under expected utility disappears with the expanded sample, as Figure 2.8 shows
below.
Fig. 2.8. Mean excess return X risk under expected utility (updated sample)
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This is good for the model, since it can be the case that the differences in mean excess
returns are now explained by smaller differences in the risk aversion levels. However, the
expanded sample is also generous with the quantile utility model. The risk-return relation
is now positive, according to Figure 2.9.
Fig. 2.9. Mean excess return X risk under quantile utility (updated sample)
Finally, Table 2.10 presents the updated estimates for quantile utility model.
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Country market value /GDP β ψ τ J-test stat. β ψ τ
Switzerland 87% 0.998 0.54 0.38 0.3 0.998 0.53 0.37
(0.001) (0.12) (0.04) (0.0001) (0.10) (0.04)
United Kingdom 79% 1.001 0.52 0.41 0.6 1.001 0.46 0.42
(0.003) (0.09) (0.04) (0.0002) (0.09) (0.04)
Australia 42% 1.068 0.06 0.45 0.2 1.054 0.07 0.45
(0.098) (0.07) (0.04) (0.0060) (0.07) (0.04)
Japan 40% 1.001 0.56 0.39 0.1 1.002 0.59 0.40
(0.003) (0.13) (0.04) (0.0003) (0.22) (0.04)
Sweden 36% 1.004 0.16 0.43 0.1 1.005 0.22 0.42
(0.029) (0.24) (0.04) (0.0020) (0.35) (0.04)
Canada 31% 1.115 0.03 0.42 1.9 1.144 0.01 0.40
(0.44) (0.10) (0.40) (0.058) (0.08) (0.04)
J-test critical values: 6.63 (1%) and  3.84 (5%)
heteroskedasticy and serial correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis
two-stepone-step
Table 2.10. International estimated parameters - updated sample
We can compare the results from Tables 2.8 and 2.10. For Switzerland, the only
significant change was an increase in the EIS estimate from 0.35 to 0.54. For the UK, the
time discount factor is now below 1, the EIS went from 0.41 to 0.52 and the downside
risk aversion was slightly reduced with  going from 0.36 to 0.41. Regarding Australia
and Japan, changes were immaterial. For Sweden, major changes happened to the time
preference. The time discount factor decreased from 1.004 to 0.974 and the EIS, which
was 0.16 but not statistically significant, is now significant and large (0.94). In Canada, the
change was due to a rise in the time discount factor, as well as in its standard error. Given
the large standard error of 0.44, the estimation of  for this country seems now to be shaky.
However, the issue of a small capitalization ratio should be playing a role one more time.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provided evidence that the quantile utility asset pricing model can also
explain the financial puzzles in other developed countries. This was an important step in
the empirical validation of the model.
The estimated parameters were robust across highly capitalized countries and quali-
tatively close to the ones obtained for the US. Moreover, we showed that the risk measure
under the quantile utility model can better justify the differences in risk premia across coun-
tries when compared to the risk measure under the expected utility model.
Chapter 3
An Empirical Evaluation of the Effects of
Margins on Asset Prices
(co-authored with Guilherme B. Martins)
3.1 Introduction
Assuming that agents are explicitly worried about the downside is not the only way to relate
downside risk to asset prices.
A number of recent theoretical works have shown that margin requirements impact
asset prices. Some examples are Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), Garleanu and Peder-
sen (2009), Gromb and Vayanos (2010) and Geanakoplos (2010). The common key feature
of these models is to consider leveraged positions which depend on margin requirements.
As a consequence, if in some periods a significant fraction of agents are credit constrained,
that is, it is harder to buy assets on margin, an additional premium may be required to hold
them.
The relation between margin requirements and downside risk is simple and direct.
When an investor buys stocks on margin, some money is put up by him (initial margin), and
the remainder is borrowed from the broker, with the purchased shares used as collateral.
How does the broker define the maximum lending amount? According to the collateral
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evaluated at a worst-case scenario. Therefore, the worse the worst-case scenario, the higher
the initial margin requirement.
As an example, suppose an investor wants to buy 100 shares at $10 each using a
debt-financed purchase and the broker evaluates the 1% conditional quantile for such stock
price at $7. In this case she accepts to lend $700 to the investor, keeping the 100 shares
as collateral since, with 99% of chance, she will not lose any money. In other words, the
initial margin is established at 30% and the investor has to self-finance 30% of the initial
position. Were the 1% conditional quantile equal to $6, the margin would be set at 40%.
The analysis of the relevance of margins is important not only to understand asset
prices. Some authors, such as Geanakoplos (2010) and Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen
(2010), have been using these models to interpret the unconventional policies implemented
by the Fed during the 2007-2010 financial crisis.
In the past three years, the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet has suf-
fered major changes. In January 2007, the Fed carried no risk of default in its assets,
holding basically US Treasury bills ($ 780 billion). During the crisis, however, a variety of
asset were included in the balance sheet in significant amounts. For example, commercial
papers ($ 350 billion), repurchase agreements ($ 150 billion), mortgage-backed securities
($ 1 trillion), Federal agency debt securities ($ 150 billion) and others ($ 100 billion). In
December 2010, the total size of the balance sheet was almost $ 2.5 trillion.
As Geanakoplos (2010) points out, the negative effect of margins on prices, together
with the fact that these elements feed back one each other, could justify such a radical
change in the Fed’s policy. According to him, during some periods, "the Fed must step
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around the banks and lend directly to investors, at more generous collateral levels than the
private markets are willing to provide."
Moreover the extra margin premium may break the non arbitrage link between the
Fed fund rate and the rate of returns of other assets in the economy. This would imply that
restricting monetary policy to its traditional instruments would not always be efficient.
This idea is illustrated by Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen’s (2010) argument. For
example, if a premium related to margin really exists, a reduction of the Fed fund rate
during crises will not necessarily translates into a expansionary policy. As we shall see
below, the margin premium is the product between the margin requirement, the cost of
margin, and the importance of the leveraged agents in aggregate consumption. The cost
of margin is equal to the shadow cost of capital for leveraged agents, which is the spread
between the uncollateralized and the collateralized (Fed fund) risk-free rates. Given that,
when the Fed fund rate is reduced in a crisis during which margin constraints bind, the
consequent increasing in the shadow cost of capital steepens the margin-return relation
and, thus, increases the required return on assets with high margin requirements. Since in
bad periods margins are significantly higher across assets, the interest rate reduction can
then have small, zero or, in the limit, even a positive effect on the aggregate required return
in the economy.
In despite of the relevance of these theoretical results, there is still no empirical work
supporting them, apart from some isolated examples for some individual assets that the
theoretical papers mentioned above provide. This chapter contributes to fill this gap, by
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looking for evidences on the existence of an aggregate premium for margins and by evalu-
ating its importance.
Our empirical findings, which are related to both the time-series and cross-section
of returns, are favorable to these models. In particular, we show that (i) a margin-related
factor is able to predict the future excess returns of the usual proxy for the market portfolio
(S&P 500), and (ii) portfolios with high betas on the margin factor pay on average higher
returns in relation to those with low margin factor betas.
We construct the factor empirical counterpart using the margin requirements on the
S&P 500 futures, the ted spread, and the consumption series for stockholders and non
stockholders of Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009). With that, we run pre-
dictability regressions and estimate a time series for the past aggregate premium related to
margins, showing that it is economically meaningful.
Around the Black Monday (19 October, 1987), margins may have been responsible
for as much as one third of the total fall in prices. Moreover, according to our results,
a small increase in the ted spread from 0:7% (its sample average) to 1:7%, with margin
requirements at their average level (4:2%), may depress the market portfolio value by 0:8%
within a 1 month period. In a worse condition of capital constraints, considering the ted
spread going from 0:7% to 3% and margins requirements fixed at 10%; the price fall would
be about 4% during the month.
Motivated by the fact that data on margins are usually very hard to obtain, we also
propose a nonparametric model for explaining margins from current and past values of the
value at risk of the specific asset. This approach, as we argue, makes theoretical sense and
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has good empirical performance. Indeed, our estimated model well predicts margin require-
ments even out of the sample. Moreover, reestimating our original forecasting regressions
using the fitted values from the VaR-based model instead of the true margin requirements,
we obtain qualitatively the same results. According to this evidence, one could potentially
estimate the margin premium for any asset, even with no data on margins.
Using this idea, we then estimate the aggregate margin premium for periods where
data on the margin on the S&P 500 futures are not available (before 1982). An interesting
conclusion emerges from this exercise since, before 1982 (and after 2004), the margin
factor seems to follow a different regime. During our main sample (1982 to 2004), once
the margin factor spikes it returns fast to its original levels. Because of that, its predictive
power on future returns appears for short horizons regressions (and disappears for longer
horizons where other traditional factors play a more important role). However, for the years
before 1982 and after 2004, the margin factor takes more time to revert after a spike. This
brings the predictive power to longer horizons regressions.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide a simple theoretical
model that motivates our empirical work. Section 3.3 presents our data as well as our main
empirical results. Section 3.4 discusses the model estimation under no data on consump-
tion, proposes a model for explaining margins and extend our empirical results to turbulent
periods.
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3.2 The theoretical model
In this section we present a theoretical model, based on Garleanu and Pedersen (2009),
which motivates our empirical work. We summarize their model and refer to their paper
for a more detailed analysis, including how to solve for the general equilibrium.
The economy has two types of agents n 2 fa; bg. Agent a is the risk-averse type













There are several risky assets in the economy. The price of risky asset i follows a
Geometric Brownian Motion process









In addition to the risky assets there are two riskless money market assets, both in zero
net supply. One represents borrowing and lending against collateral at the interest rate rct
and the other uncollateralized loans with interest rate rut .
The first type is available to all agents in the economy. For example, when one
investor takes a long position in a risky asset she can borrow in the collateralized loan
market. To do so she must make some collateral available to her broker. The amount of
required collateral is determined by the haircut applied by the broker. The haircut is the
margin requirement, denoted by mit; and determines how much of her own capital she must
use to make the initial investment. Similarly, if she takes a short position, she must also
deposit collateral as margin with her broker or at some exchange. In both cases, the margin
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is computed as a fraction of the total position: if the agent invests a fraction it of their
wealth Wt in the risk asset i, she must deposit mitjitjWt as margin. Note again that she
must deposit a positive margin whether she is long or short in the asset. Finally, the margin
deposits are remunerated at rct .
The uncollateralized loan market is a standard one. It is riskless as the collateralized
loan. However, only type b agents can contract uncollateralized loans and therefore, as we
show below, when this agent is capital constrained, the two interest rates are different.
Every instant, each consumer can chose how much to consume (Ct), the fraction of
her wealth she wants to invest in the risky assets, and in the uncollateralized loan market
(ut ). Any residual wealth is invested in the collateralized loan market. The evolution of




















Consumers take as given all prices and maximize (3.28) subject to (3.30) and, because
of the margins requirement,
X
i
mitjitj+ ut  1: (3.31)
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the type b consumer is given by
0 = Maxf e t C
1 n
s
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The solution to this problem yields, in the case agent b is long in the risky asset i, two
conditions:
rut   rct =  t; (3.32)





where  t is the shadow price of capital (ie, the Lagrangian Multiplier associated with









A similar problem is solved by agents of type a, with the only difference that he
cannot chose ut . If we assume that his capital constraint is never biding, the solution
to his portfolio choice problem is given by it   rct = aC
a
t . Then aggregating across
consumers is straightforward and gives the main result from Garleanu and Pedersen (2009)
that motivates our empirical work.
The risk premium of risky asset i; when only consumers of type b can be capital
constrained and are long in this asset, is given by a margin-based premium in addition to
the standard consumption-based premium,


























Equation (3.34) is the main testable implication of the model. It states that the excess
returns of any risky asset is composed of two terms. The first term is the standard risk
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premium in the CAPM literature: the product of the price of risk, which is given by an
average of the risk aversion of the different agents in the economy, and the covariance
between aggregate consumption and the return of the asset. The second term is the novelty.
Because some investors might be capital constrained and cannot deposit additional margins,
they require an additional premium to hold such an asset in equilibrium.
This extra premium is a combination of three factors. First,  t measures how binding
the capital constraint is. By equation (3.32), it is given by the difference of two interest
rates rut   rct . The second factor mit, is the margin requirement itself. The last term gives
the importance of the constrained investor in the economy. As emphasized by Garleanu
and Pedersen (2009), even though the consumption share of the type b can be small, xt
can still be large because it takes into account the differences in risk aversion. In the next
sections, we empirically test the model and evaluate the importance of this extra premium.
3.3 Testable implications of the model
The theoretical model presented in the previous section has implications for both the time-
series and the cross-section of expected returns. Indeed, equation (3.34) implies that (i) the
margin-related factor should forecast future excess returns on a market portfolio and that
(ii) stocks with higher margin requirements should, on average, earn higher returns (ceteris
paribus). In this section we investigate both testable implications.
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3.3.1 Predicting the market portfolio return
Suppose that there is only one risky asset in the economy, the market portfolio. According
to equation (3.34) we would have
rt+h   rct+h = 1xtmt t + z0t2 + et+h; (3.37)
where rt+h and rct+h are the h-period ahead risky and collateralized risk-free returns respec-
tively, et+h is an error term with zero conditional mean, zt is a k  1 vector with standard
risk factors other than the margin-related one, 1 is the price of the margin factor and 2 is
a k  1 vector of parameters related to the prices of the other risk factors.
A main issue in the estimation of equation (3.37) is data availability. First, as Geanako-
plos (2010) indicates, measures of aggregate margin are very hard to get historically. Sec-
ond, data on xt, which measures the ratio of the aggregate consumption due to the brave
investor (and not simply aggregate consumption), is also not readily available. Third, it
may not be immediately clear which variable should well represent  t:
We circumvent these three issues. With respect to the first, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange has data on the margin requirements on the S&P 500 futures. This is the exact
information one would need for the estimation of a margin premium for the aggregate
economy under the standard assumption of proxing the market portfolio by the S&P 500
index. Since one can interchangeably trade spot and future contracts, margin requirements
in future and spot markets should be tightly, if not perfectly, related. Hence, we use the
CME margin requirements as mt in our model.
3.3 Testable implications of the model 81
Regarding xt; the problem of disaggregating consumption among different groups
of individuals is not new in the asset pricing literature. Since Mankiw and Zeldes (1989)
a number of papers have been trying to come up with measures for the consumption of
stockholders as a way to address the equity premium puzzle. Because stockholders’ con-
sumption covariates more with returns, such studies are able to generate more reasonable
risk aversion levels among other good results. Ait-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2004), for
example, employ data on the consumption of luxury goods as a proxy for stockholder’s
consumption. More recently, Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) use mi-
crolevel household consumption data to approximate this series. It is natural to use one
of these series to construct a measure for xt. We use the data of Malloy, Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jørgensen (2009).
With respect to  t, the shadow price of capital, equation (3.32) says that in equilib-
rium  t has to be equal to the spread between the uncollateralized and the collateralized
risk-free rates. In other words, it is a measure of how binding the capital constraint is. The
well-known ted spread is given by the difference between the interest rates on interbank
loans (Libor) and American treasury bills and, because of that, it is a widely observed in-
dicator of credit conditions in financial markets. Hence, it is a straightforward choice to
represent  t.
Data construction
Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) construct separate series for quar-
terly consumption growth rates for stockholders and nonstockholders, at monthly frequency,
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using data from the (Consumer Expenditure Survey) CEX for the period March 1982 to
November 2004. The CEX survey has responses from households where they indicate
whether they hold a positive amount of "stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other such secu-
rities". About 77 percent of the households, on average for all periods, answer negatively
to this question. However, besides than simply using the households with a positive re-
sponse to constructing the stockholders’ consumption, the authors employ a more careful
approach. In order to mitigate response error, they supplement the CEX definition with a
probit analysis designed to predict the probability that a household owns stocks. They then
define a household as stockholder if it has both answered positively to the CEX question
and its fitted probability of holding stocks is higher than half. We refer the reader to their
paper for a detailed description of these series and their methodology.
We use their consumption growth rates to compute xt in accordance to equation
(3.36); assuming that the brave and risk-averse agents in the theoretical model are, re-
spectively, the stockholder and non stockholder agents from their paper. Since only growth
rates are available from their original data, we are able to compute only the growth rates of
xt. Therefore, we can only identify 1 up to a scale. However, this is enough to our goal.
With that we can both test the existence of a margin-related factor, i.e., the significance of
1, and estimate a time series for the size of the total margin premium, 1xtmt t:
Imposing B = 1 and A = 10; which are the values assumed by Garleanu and
Pedersen (2009) in their analysis of the model’s predictions, we end up with the plot for xt
presented in Figure 3.10.
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Fig. 3.10. The time-series for xt (level not identified)
With respect to mt; we first compute the daily ratio between the margin requirements
on S&P 500 futures for members of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (available from April
1982) and the value of the underlying S&P 500 index multiplied by the size of the contract.
This is the usual way of computing margins. Then we define mt as the monthly average
of this series. The ted spread,  t; is computed as the difference between the 3-month libor
rate and the 3-month treasury bill. For the libor rate we use the Eurodollar 3-month deposit
rate in the London market, collected by Federal Reserve Board of Governors. This series
begins in January 1971 (because of the Eurodollar). Figure 3.11 plots mt and  t:
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Fig. 3.11. The time-series for mt and  t:
Figure 3.12 plots the constructed times-series for the margin-related factor, xtmt t;
that ranges from April 1982 to November 2004. According to it, the margin-related factor
spikes around periods of financial distress. Note also that when wandering around its low
levels, it is rather persistent. However, once it spikes, it has in general a fast reversion. This
characteristic, compatible to the idea of brief periods of binding capital constraints, will be
important in the interpretation of the results below.
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Fig. 3.12. The time-series for xtmt t (level not identified).
Even though this factor has a clear theoretical meaning given by the theoretical model
and empirically confirmed by the relation between the spikes and events in the figure above,
we should still control equation (3.37) for the traditional risk factors if we want to estimate
1: Therefore we construct the zt vector with the following standard variables: dividend
yield, volatility (mean of squared daily returns), lag of the return and dividend-earning
ratio.
Results
Tables 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 present the estimates of model (3.37) for h = 1; 2; 4
and 12-months ahead.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
x m ted 2.55*** 2.14*** 2.71*** 2.63*** 2.55*** 2.33*** 1.9**
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.040)
dy 8.74 8.01 13.3
(0.24) (0.29) (0.11)






constant 1.15 -6.64 2.71 0.54 -2.96 -4.52 -21.3
(0.77) (0.43) (0.50) (0.91) (0.81) (0.59) (0.21)
R2-adj 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 1.4% 1.4% 2.1% 1.8%
White adjusted p-values between brackets
h=1
Table 3.11. 1-month ahead regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
x m ted 1.94*** 1.47** 1.91*** 2.02*** 1.9.*** 1.42** 1.04
(0.002) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.031) (0.170)
dy 9.91 10.14 15.31
(0.11) (0.10) (0.03)






constant 2.84 -5.99 2.51 2.25 -1.16 -6.66 -25.38
(0.38) (0.39) (0.44) (0.56) (0.91) (0.34) (0.08)
R2-adj 2.0% 3.1% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 2.8% 3.1%
Newey-West adjusted (order equal to 1) p-values between brackets
h = 2
Table 3.12. 2-month ahead regressions
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
x m ted 1.15* 0.63 1.11 1.17 1.15* 0.55 0.02
(0.093) (0.291) (0.108) (0.106) (0.094) (0.349) (0.986)
dy 11.17** 11.47** 18.14**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)






constant 4.82 -5.13 4.36 4.68 1.03 -6 -27.3*
(0.11) (0.43) (0.15) (0.12) (0.91) (0.35) (0.07)
R2-adj 1.4% 4.7% 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 4.8% 7.0%
Newey-West adjusted (order equal to 3) p-values between brackets
h = 4
Table 3.13. 4-month ahead regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
x m ted 0.52 0.04 0.51 0.58 0.52 0.015 -0.28
(0.320) (0.937) (0.327) (0.299) (0.321) (0.973) (0.550)
dy 10.25 10.34* 14.04**
(0.11) (0.09) (0.04)






constant 5.9* -3.24 5.85* 5.44 6.6 -3.48 -15.17
(0.06) (0.35) (0.06) (0.14) (0.47) (0.63) (0.22)
R2-adj 0.7% 10.1% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 9.9% 12.0%
Newey-West adjusted (order equal to 11) p-values between brackets
h = 12
Table 3.14. 12-month ahead regressions
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In all tables above, column 1 presents the estimate of 1 with no control, columns 2
to 5 add controls individually, column 6 adds both dividend-yield and volatility at the same
time, and column 7 is the usually called "kitchen sink" regression.
The results indicate that the margin-related factor is highly significant for predicting
excess returns at very short horizons, even after controlling for other risk factors. However,
as h increases its predictive power decreases. In fact, at 4-month ahead, the margin factor
has possibly no role left in explaining expected future excess returns.
The fact that we see high forecasting power in the short-run regressions is probably
due to the characteristics of the margin factor mentioned in the previous subsection. Its
statistical significance should be coming from a limited number of points in the sample,
the ones where it significantly spikes. As Figure 3.3 shows, they end relatively fast and,
because of that, predictability shows up for the short run regressions (once it spikes prices
go down but return soon). This is in sharp contrast to the dividend yield factor for instance,
which tracks longer period movements and therefore do not predict short horizons returns.
It is fair to say that while the standard risk factors are more related to business cycles, the
margin-based factor has more to do with financial sharp conditions.
However, if the margin-factor is significant at the 1-month horizon, one could expect
it also to be significant at longer horizons. Indeed, if prices fall and rise within the next
month, this variation is included within the next 3 months for example. So, why does
b1 decrease and lose significance as h increases? A simple explanation for that can be
illustrated by the following stylized example.
Suppose that for a general factor w we have
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0;w.p. 1   (3.39)
where rt;t+1 is the return from t to t+ 1, "t follows a white noise process and  2 [0; 1] :
According to equation (3.38) the factor w has predictive power over future returns.
Equation (3.39) tells us that at each period the factor can assume either a low (normal pe-
riods) or a high (capital constrained periods) value. For low , we would have a factor that
spikes from time to time and, when it does, has a good chance of returning fast. According
to Figure 3.12, this seems to be a fair representation of the margin factor, at least for this
period in the sample.30
A model like this would imply
Et (rt;t+1) = bwt










= bwt + (h  1) bw:
and, therefore,







30 A process for wt with 3 levels instead of 2 would be more appropriate, but nothing would change in our
argument.
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where rt+h is the h-month ahead return expressed per year (as in the regressions above).
Hence, as h increases, the factor coefficient in the regressions decreases and, with
noisy data and other factors playing a role, eventually loses significance. This is probably
what is happening in the regressions above.
In addition to being statistically significant for short horizons, price movements re-
lated to margins are economically meaningful, as Figure 3.13 illustrates.
Fig. 3.13. The margin-related premium
Figure 3.13 plots the time-series of b1xtmt t for b1 = 2:33 (the value on the sixth
column of Table 3.11). The difference between Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 is that the
values on the y-axis are meaningful in the later (we are able to identify the whole premium).
The y-axis in Figure 3.13 is in terms of simple returns for a 1-month period. For instance,
in the months of August, September and October of 1982, around the event known as Black
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Monday, prices would have plunged 2.2%, 3.9% and 4.1%, respectively, only because of
margin risk. To get a sense of perspective, these numbers added represent almost one third
of the total fall in stock prices (37%) during this period.
The other times of high premium were around the Fed (Volcker) fight against infla-
tion, the first savings and loans crisis, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and the years of the
Russian default, the LTCM downturn and the dot-com crash. In these periods, prices fell
between 1% and 2.5% just because of margins.
Another useful exercise is to understand the impact in prices of changes in the credit
market conditions. To compute it, we first fix the levels for xt, mt  t at their averages,
namely, 0:92, 4:2% and 0:7% and, using the same sixth column of Table 3.11, we conclude
that a 1% raise in margins (from 0:7% to 1:7%) would drop stock prices by 0:8% within
one month. In a worse condition for capital constraints, considering the ted spread going
from 0:7% to 3% and margins requirements fixed in 10%; the price decreasing would be
about 4% during the month.
What is driving the predictability?
One may be fairly suspicious that the predictability results presented above are simply
due to the ted spread, and have nothing to do with margins. Since the ted spread is generally
high during periods of financial distress, it could predict future returns by itself. On the
other hand, the same could be said about the margin requirements. Margins are higher in
bad periods, and this could be enough to produce predictability of future returns.
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To investigate this issue, we re-estimate column 1 from Tables 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and
3.14, controlling for the ted spread and margin requirement alone. According to the theory
from section 3.2, an increase in the ted spread should have no effect on future returns if
margins are set to zero. Analogously, an increase in margins should induce no additional
premium if there is no cost of buying on margin (zero ted spread). Hence, the coefficients
of such controls should be not significant.
Table 3.15 shows that this is exactly what happens. The ted spread and margin re-
quirement alone are not significant. Although the p-values of the margin factor under this
augmented specification are larger than the original p-values (the ones from Tables 3.11,
3.12, 3.13 and 3.14, the correct specification according to equation 3.37), we still have
empirical evidence of a margin premium at 10% of significance for 1- and 2-month ahead.
h=1 h=2 h=4 h=12
x m ted 4.20* 3.26* 2.41 2.36
(0.068) (0.099) (0.172) (0.155)
ted -4.41 -2.54 -1.94 -6.02
(0.72) (0.79) (0.84) (0.41)
m -3.69 -3.55 -3.65 -3.51
(0.24) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16)
constant 15.09 -15.79 17.93 19.65
(0.27) (0.13) (0.06) (0.04)
R2-adj 1.6% 2.7% 3.9% 6.8%
White adjusted p-values between brackets
Table 3.15. Controlling for possible isolated effects of the ted spread and margins.
Hence, an increase in the ted spread will affect future returns only if margins require-
ments are positive. This is exactly the channel predicted by the theoretical model.
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3.3.2 The margin factor and the cross-section of expected returns
As equation (3.34) indicates, in a setting with many risky assets, we can think about a
common risk factor related to margins given by xt t. In this case, each risky asset would
load on this factor according to its average margin requirement:
Given that, as an additional test of the margin-CAPM, we can examine how average
returns of different portfolios relate to their exposures to the process xt t. The theory
suggests that portfolios that covary more with xt t are the ones with higher average margin
requirements and, because of that, should earn higher average returns.
To investigate that we first construct portfolios formed on the basis of stocks’ expo-
sures to xt t: In December of each year, we estimate a pre-ranking beta related to xt t (the
margin beta) for every NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock with share code 10 and 11 in
the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago) database,
using two to five years (as available) of prior monthly returns. We then form ten equally
weight portfolios based on these pre-ranking margin betas and compute their returns for
the next twelve months. We repeat this process for each year from 1984 to 2004. The re-
sult is monthly returns on ten margin-related beta-sorted portfolios. Figure 3.14 plots the
ten portfolio’s average excess return against their post-ranking margin beta, estimated by
regressing their monthly returns on xt t:
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Fig. 3.14. 10 portfolios sorted by margin beta.
Since the ted spread is high in periods of financial distress, the margin betas are nega-
tive for all portfolios. In accordance to Figure 3.14, portfolios that suffer higher losses when
xt t increases (portfolios with more negative margin betas or, given the theory, higher av-
erage margin requirements) present, on average, higher expect returns. This is in favor of
the margin-CAPM.
A natural concern refers to the fact that since the ted spread is higher in bad financial
periods, the price of the risk factor xt t may be closely related to the price of the standard
CAPM risk. In fact, stocks that present higher losses in bad periods should pay on average
higher expected returns under the standard CAPM. Given that, it is important to check
whether the margin-related risk is still priced after controlling for the CAPM risk. To do
that, we can estimate the usual cross-sectional regression
3.3 Testable implications of the model 95
TX
t=1
rt;i=T = bmi m + bi+ ui; (3.41)
where bmi and bi are, respectively, the time-series estimates of the post-ranking margin
beta and of the standard CAPM beta (obtained from regressing each of the portfolios on
the market return). As usual, we do not include a free constant in the regression, since it
would imply a paradoxical risk-free rate that has a nonzero excess return relative to itself.
Moreover, since the sample is not too long, omitting an intercept and thus imposing a
(theoretically valid) restriction of the model delivers more power.
Table 3.16 presents the results from the cross-sectional regression (3.41). Besides
using the ten portfolios sorted on the margin-related beta, we also include the 25 Fama-
French portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market to the analysis.31
margin beta -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.006***
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0021)
CAPM beta 0.009** 0.002**  0.009*** 0.005***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0013)
10 portolios sorted by
margin beta
25 portolios sorted by
size and book-to-market
Table 3.16. Cross-sectional regressions with 10 and 25 portfolios.
As we can see, the risk related to the factor xt t is distinct from the standard CAPM
risk. Although the price of the margin risk decreases when the regression is controlled for
the CAPM risk, it still remains strongly significant. Note that the price of the margin risk
31 The regressions with the Fama-French portfolios use monthly observations from 1982 to 2004. For the
10 porfolios sorted by margin beta, we lost the first two years of the sample in order to estiamate the first
pre-ranking betas and, hence, we use monthly returns from 1984 to 2004.
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appears with a negative sign because bmi is also negative. Hence, a larger bmi in absolute
terms (i.e., a larger average margin requirement) implies a larger risk premium.
An issue with the regressions above is that the regressors in the second step, that is,
the betas, are just estimates. A simple way to account for the effect of generated regressors
in this application is to map the whole estimation into GMM.
Following the methodology presented in Cochrane (2005, pg. 241), for each portfolio
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we will end up estimating the analogous to the OLS cross-sectional estimates for m and
 presented in table Table 3.16.32 The only difference is that we here take the uncertainty
about the generated betas into account. In this case, we end up with 3N + 2 moment
conditions, the same number of parameters.
32 To see this, define i = (mi ; i)
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By performing such an exactly identified GMM estimation, we obtain values close
to the ones from table 3.16. For the ten portfolios sorted by the margin-related beta, the
estimates for m and  are, respectively, 0:0021 and 0:0018; both significant at 1%. Using
the 25 Fama-French portfolios, we obtain for m and  the values of  0:004 and 0:003;
respectively, both significant at 1% as well.
Given that, the results of this section support the prediction of equation (3.34) that
high margin betas stocks earn comparatively higher average returns.
3.4 Further empirical investigation
The previous section provided empirical support for the existence of a risk premium related
to margin requirements. In this section, we produce some additional results regarding the
predictability of future returns.
Figure 3.11 shows that two interesting periods for the ted spread were left out of the
analysis. The years between 1971 and 1982 and after 2004 are periods where our measure
of capital constraint presented considerable larger mean and variance and, given that, it
would be nice to test the theoretical model using these data as well. However, to do that,
one would have to deal with the fact that there are no data for xt before 1982 and after
2004, and no data for margins before 1982.
To overcome these issues, we first show that data on xt is not essential to estimate
equation (3.37). Since the variation in xt is small relatively to the variation in mt and  t,
omitting xt creates only a small bias. Moreover, we argue and empirically show that such
a bias is negative, what, in case of not rejecting the model, does not harm the conclusion.
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After that, we propose a way of modeling margins as a function of past returns and
values at risk. As we discuss, this is theoretically reasonable. Moreover, we empirically
show that the proposed model is able to predict the important movements in margin, even
out of the sample.
3.4.1 Omitting consumption
Suppose we didn’t have data on xt: How would this change the estimation results obtained
in the previous section? Very little.
The central point is that what drives the spikes in Figure 3.13 are mt and  t; with xt
almost playing no role. This happens since xt accounts for a very small part in the variation
of the factor xtmt t. To see this we can compare the standard deviations of log (xtmt t)
and log (mt t) :33While the log of the full factor has standard error equal to 0.835, the
standard error is equal to 0.834 for the log of the factor with xt omitted.
To empirically understand the size and sign of the bias from omitting xt in model
(3.37), we rewrite it as
rt+h   rct+h = 1mt t + z0t2 + 1 (xt   1)mt t + et+h
and compare the estimate of 1 from the restricted regression considering the full model
(hence, the same estimate as above) and the regression omitting 1 (xt   1)mt t: Table
3.17 brings both estimates of 1; for h = 1; 2; 4 and 12:
33 Comparing the standard deviations without taking logs would be misleading since xt is always below 1.
This would depress the variance of xtmt t per se. With additivity from logs this effect vanishes.
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Newey-West adjusted p-values between brackets
δ1 estimate
Table 3.17. The effect of ommiting consumption
Table 3.17 indicates that the small bias from omitting xt should be negative. The
intuition for this is simple. First consider xt fixed. Since xt   1 < 0; when mt and/or  t
increases, the omitted term (xt   1)mt t decreases. Since xt is very stable compared to
mt and  t; this argument is robust for letting xt to vary: Indeed, the estimated correlation
between mt t and (xt   1)mt t is  0:97.
Based on this, we conclude that the lack of data on xt does not preclude the estimation
of the model.
3.4.2 Modelling margins
Data on margins are rare. Therefore, a good model for predicting it from other observable
variables should be useful. We show that a nonparametric model with past returns and
values at risk can do this job.
In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) model, for example, "Speculators finance their
trades through collateralized borrowing from financiers who set the margins to control their
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value-at-risk", where "... each financier ensures that the margin is large enough to cover the
position’s value-at-risk ".
Indeed, as discussed in the introduction, the relation between margin requirements
and a worst-case scenario is natural. Given that the VaR is the most common approach
used by market practitioners to measure worst-case scenarios, margins and VaR should be
related.
Based on this, we assume the margin requirement for an asset to be a function of its
current and past 1% VaR and returns. We augment the reasoning above with past VaR since
it may take some time for the margin settler to adjust it. The inclusion of past returns are
justified since we are using margins as a ratio of some principal investment. If, instead of
the 1% VaR we use the 2.5% or the 5%, we end up with, qualitatively, the same results.
Define g : Rkv+kr+2 ! R to be an unknown function. We then have
mt = g (V aRt; :::; V aRt kv ; rt; :::; rt kr) + ut; (3.42)
where ut is an error term.
To estimate (3.42), we have to first estimate the VaR series. There are a number of
alternative ways to model the VaR of returns. Basically, they differ in how the distribution
of the returns is estimated. One approach is to assume a given distribution for returns
(in general, lognormality) and then to model the return’s conditional variance so that we
can compute any given conditional quantile from there. This is the case of the RiskMetrics
methodology. Another approach is to not impose any return distribution and directly model
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the conditional quantile. We use this last approach because it is more general, robust and
allows for a broad class of variables to have impact in our proxy for margins requirements.
We employ the CAViaR of Engle and Manganelli (2001). The CAViaR, which stands
for conditional auto-regressive value at risk, extends a standard quantile regression by al-
lowing a dynamic specification for the conditional quantile. The reason is that since volatil-
ities of stock market returns cluster over time, the VaR, which is closely linked to the vari-
ance of the distribution, may exhibit a similar behavior.
Let Qrt+1 ( jIt) be the  th conditional quantile of a return rt+1 conditional on the
information It available at time t: Under the CAViaR specification,
Qrt+1 ( jIt) = X
0
t1 () + 2 ()Qrt ( jIt 1) ; (3.43)
where Xt is a vector that contains the relevant conditioning information for estimating the
 th conditional quantile. The conditional 1% VaR computed at t for the S&P 500 returns
at t+ 1 is then defined as
V aRt;1% (rt+1) =  Qrt+1 (0:01jIt) :
The recursive specification in equation (3.43) does not allow one to use standard
quantile regressions methods for the estimation of 1 and 2. Because of that, we use the
quasi-bayesian estimator of Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). We provide in the appendix
a brief explanation of the estimation method and refer the reader to their article for further
details.
To define the variables that belong to Xt, we follow Cenesizoglu and Timmermann
(2008), who consider whether a range of economic variables are helpful in predicting dif-
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ferent quantiles of the S&P 500 returns. According to their study, the most significant
variables to predict the 1% conditional quantile are: earnings-price ratio, book to market
ratio, default yield spread, default return spread, cross sectional premium, stock variance,
dividend payout ratio, net equity expansion, term spread and inflation. As in Cenesizoglu
and Timmermann (2008), we obtain these variables from the updated data set constructed
by Goyal and Welch (2007).
In addition to these variables, we include the absolute value of the lag of the return.
Engle and Manganelli (2001) provide a clear justification for using this variable: " ... we
would expect the VaR to increase as rt 1 becomes very negative, as one bad day makes the
probability of the next somewhat greater. It might be that very good days also increase VaR
as would be the case for volatility models. Hence VaR could depend symmetrically upon
jrt 1j :"
We estimate model (3.42) under four different specifications for function g: The first
is the general function as written there, the second assumes full linearity, the third imposes
linearity inside g (single index model) and the forth is the additive nonparametric model,
mt = gv;0(V aRt) + :::+ gv;kv(V aRt kv) (3.44)
+gr;0(rt) + :::+ gr;kr(rt kr) + ut;
where gv;0; :::; gv;kv ; gr;0; :::; gr;kr are unknown functions from R to R:
We impose for all of them kv = kr = 6. It seems unreasonable that higher lag orders
may be useful in the model. For a number of criteria both inside and outside the sample
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(correlation, mean squared error and mean absolute error), the last specification is the one
that best performs and, therefore, we focus on it.
We use in the estimation of (3.44) the method of penalized splines, firstly proposed
by O’Sullivan (1986), refined by Eiders and Marx (1996), and made popular through the
book by Ruppert, Wand, and Carroll (2003). We present the method in the appendix.34
First, using data from April 1982 (when data on margin begins) to November 2008
(when data for Xt; from Goyal and Welch, for the VaR estimation ends), we estimate bmt;
the fitted margin under model (3.44). Figure 3.15 plots mt and bmt.
Fig. 3.15. Margin x fitted margin (in sample).
The figure above shows that the spike in margin that occurred about October 1987
was perfectly fitted by the model. The timing of the spike from the last financial crisis was
34 The other nonparametrics especifications for g (full nonparametric and single index) were estimted by
local linear regression and Ichimura’s method respectively.
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perfectly fitted too, although the model over-predicted its size. In general, the trend of the
margin is well reproduced (the only exception is the period between 2003 and 2007) . The
main issue with the model may be that it predicts more variability for margins than there
exists indeed. However, this should not affect estimation if it is random. The correlation
between both series is 65%.
One may fairly wonder how much of these good results are due to over-fitting of the
nonparametric model. Very little, if anything. To show this, we estimate the model using
data up to December 2001 (75% of the sample) and analyzes the results from January 2002
to November 2008 (25% of the sample).
Figure 3.16 plots the margin and both the in-sample (from the previous regression)
and out-of-sample fitted margins.
Fig. 3.16. Comparing in and out-of-sample fitted values.
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According to Figure 3.16, there is no significant loss from predicting margins out of
the sample. The correlations between fitted and actual margins for this period are 60% and
50% in and out of the sample, showing a small decrease. It is fair to say, however, that the
size of the raise in margins in the last financial crisis was better predicted out of the sample.
This indicates that model (3.44) along with a CAViaR estimation for the value at
risk can well explain the important movements in margins. To confirm this, we reestimate
model (3.37) using now the fitted margins instead of the true ones and compare the results.









Newey-West adjusted p-values between brackets
δ1 estimate
Table 3.18. Using fitted margins instead of true margins
We can also consider both omissions at the same time. That is, we rewrite
rt+h   rct+h = 1xtmt t + z0t2 + et+h
= 1xt (bmt + ut) t + z0t2 + et+h
= 1xt bmt t + z0t2 + 1xtut t + et+h
= 1 bmt t + z0t2 + 1 (xt   1) bmt t + 1xtut t + et+h
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and compare the original estimates of 1 (with both no control and controlling for dy and
vol) with the ones obtained when running
rt+h   rct+h = 1 bmt t + z0t2 + et+h: (3.45)
Table 3.19 present the results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
horizon original fitted m and no x original fitted m and no x
h=1 2.55*** 2.21*** 2.33*** 1.99**
(0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.024)
h=2 1.94*** 1.88*** 1.42** 1.34**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.031) (0.033)
h=4 1.15* 1.17* 0.55 0.51
(0.093) (0.076) (0.349) (0.431)
h=12 0.52 0.57 0.015 -0.007
(0.320) (0.242) (0.973) (0.988)
Newey-West adjusted p-values between brackets
δ1 estimate (no controls) δ1 estimate (controlling for dy and vol)
Table 3.19. Omitting consumption and using fitted margins
Column 1 in Table 3.19 brings the original estimates for 1 using no control in the
regression. Column 3 brings the original estimates of 1 including in the regressions the
dividend yield and the volatility. Columns 2 and 4 are their counterparts omitting consump-
tion and using fitted margins as in equation (3.45).
Individual results from both previous sections still hold. The estimates for 1 under
equation (3.45) are close to the original ones, mainly for h > 1: For 1-month ahead, the
already discussed negative bias is more evident, but still not large.
We now use such evidences to justify the augmentation of our sample.
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3.4.3 Results with augmented sample
Table 3.20 presents the average and standard deviation of our main variables.
1971-1981 1982-2004 2005-2010* 1971-1981 1982-2004 2005-2010*
S&P 500 margin - 4.08% 6.23% - 1.62% 2.38%
ted spread 1.86% 0.69% 0.88% 1.05% 0.57% 0.79%
consumption ratio - 0.92 - - 0.08 -
margin factor - 2.55 - - 2.80 -
* until April 2010
mean stand. deviation
Table 3.20. Descriptive statistics
Two special periods were not considered in the estimation in section 3.3, namely,
the years between 1971 and 1981 and after 2004. They were not included in our main
sample since there are no data for margins and consumption before 1982 and no data for
consumption after 2004. However, as we argued previously, estimating equation (3.45)
should deliver reasonable estimates for 1: Therefore, we use this fact to investigate the
model using the whole period between January 1971 and April 2010.
We define two distinct series for bmt. The first is simply the fitted values from the
nonparametric model. The second uses these fitted values only for the periods where there
are no margin data. The following results are qualitatively the same for both series, and we
present the ones that uses the later definition.
The included periods are special since, as we can see in Table 3.20, they have higher
average and standard deviation for ted spread and margins. However, this is not the whole
story, as Figure 3.17 shows.
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Fig. 3.17. The factor for the augmented sample (bmt t):
According to Figure 3.17, for the years to the left of the first dashed line and to the
right of the second dashed line, the factor seems to follow a different stochastic process
compared to the one between dashed lines. Crucially, it spends more time at high than at
low levels. Once it spikes, it takes a while to return.
Hence, besides the included periods being more volatile with respect to the margin
factor variables, they also have a different regime for the margin factor. In what follows, we
refer to these periods as turbulent periods. Such a difference in regimes within the sample
have interesting consequences for the empirical analysis of the theoretical model, as we
show now.
When we run equation (3.45) using the whole sample from 1971 to 2010, the esti-
mated coefficient of the interaction bmt t is non-significant for all horizons with any control
3.4 Further empirical investigation 109
(and no control). This would be enough evidence for an econometrician to reject the theo-
retical model. However, as we argue now, this conclusion would be misleading.
In a nutshell, between 1982 and 2004, we have a margin factor that spikes and re-
turns fast to its original level. As presented and discussed in section 3.3.1, this leads to
forecasting regressions with a positive and significant coefficient for the margin factor at
short horizons, but a coefficient statistically equal to zero at longer horizons. However, on
the other hand, for the periods before 1982 and after 2004 the spikes take more time to re-
turn. The immediate effect of that is the forecasting power moving from short to longer
horizons. As a consequence, when we run regressions mixing these two distinct regimes
for the margin factor, we wrongly conclude that there is no premium for margin. The expla-
nation for that is the following. Considering the full sample, the included periods (before
1982 and after 2004) are important enough to eliminate the forecasting power at the short
run, but not important enough not to create a forecasting power at the long run.
To see this, we first run rolling-windows regressions for h = 1 using the full sample.
We estimate equation (3.45), with dividend yield and volatility included, using overlapping
windows with 60 months each.35 We then plot the t-statistics obtained in each window,
relating them to two variables that measure volatility in the margin factor (which, as dis-
cussed above, is related to the length of the spikes): the standard deviations of the ted
spread and of the factor (bmt t). Figures 3.18 and 3.19 present the results.
35 Using longer windows is not appropriate since the included periods have 10 and 5 years each.
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Fig. 3.18. t-statistic vs. ted standard deviation (1-month ahead regressions).
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Fig. 3.19. t-statistic vs. factor (mt t) standard deviation (1-month ahead regressions).
In both figures above the vertical dashed lines indicate the 95% significance levels.
The horizontal dashed lines indicate the third quartile of the variables in the y-axis. From
the 407 sub-samples, in 93 of them we conclude for the presence of a positive margin pre-
mium (t- statistic higher than 1.96). In 10 sub-samples we have a negative and significant
t- statistic and we see this as a small sample issue (since it has no theoretical reasoning and
the sub-samples are small indeed).
Figure 3.18 uses the standard deviation of the ted spread as a measure of turbulence in
the credit market. The points above (below) the horizontal dashed line come from turbulent
(non turbulent) sub-samples. Out of the 93 sub-samples with premium for margin, only
1 belongs to a turbulent period. Figure 3.19 defines turbulent periods as the ones with
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high standard deviation of the product bmt t; our factor in this section. According to this
criterion, no turbulent period with margin premium was left.
In other words, turbulent periods (which are characterized by the margin factor hav-
ing longer spikes) do not produce predictability at short horizons. A direct conclusion is
that the margin premium for short horizons disappeared with the augmented sample be-
cause the included periods are turbulent ones.
To complete the story, we have now to show that in such turbulent periods the fore-
casting power of the margin factor has moved to the long horizons regressions. Accord-
ingly, we run a 12-month ahead regression for the months between 1971 and 1980 (returns
go until 1981 then). Unfortunately, to run the same regression for the recent financial cri-
sis period however, we would have to wait some additional years (as Figure 3.17 shoes, the
margin factor returned to its low level only in the end of 2009). Table 3.21 presents the
results.
(1) (2)









Newey-West adjusted (order equal to 11) p-values between brackets
h = 12, period: 1971 - 1980
Table 3.21. Turbulent period: 12-month ahead regression
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As expected, the predictive power of the margin factor shows up for longer horizons
during this period. Given that, we conclude that the horizon at which the margin premium
shows up may depend on the regime of the margin factor. During most of the time, when
the margin factor spikes it returns fast and, hence, the premium shows up at short horizons.
However, during turbulent periods, the spikes are longer and the premium takes more time
to show up. Interestingly, a regression with both kinds of periods mixed together may lead
to a wrong rejection of the model. This last point may be a useful observation for other
models’ tests.
3.5 Conclusion
We evaluated the effect of margins on asset prices. This is an additional channel for the re-
lation between downside risk and prices. Our main contribution was to provide evidence
of the existence of an aggregate margin-related premium. This fact have important theoret-
ical consequences that are not limited to the understanding of asset prices. For instance, it
affects monetary policy efficiency during some periods.
Besides discussing the choice of data to estimate the margin-based models, we also
provided results that may be useful to deal with problems of data availability. Indeed,
margin requirements data are not easily available. To deal with this issue, we proposed
a nonparametric model for explaining margins from current and past values of the value
at risk of the specific asset. We argued that this model has good theoretical and empiri-
cal properties. This isolated result should be useful in many applications that use margin
requirements.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1:






























and the first order conditions are
 : u0 (Ct)Pt = u0 (Qt (Ct+1))Q

t (Xt+1)


































Proof of Proposition 2:
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P ft = tX
f
t+1

























with the second equation holding as an inequality for at least one point in the support of
Xt+1:
Substituting (6.46) into the first equation of (6.47),
ttQ






) ftXft+1 =  tQt (Xt+1)
which, into the second equation of (6.47) gives the necessary and sufficient condition for
arbitrage,
t (Xt+1  Qt (Xt+1))  0
with inequality for at least one point in the support of Xt+1:
Therefore, all we need to rule out arbitrage is to impose
Qt (Xt+1) 2 (min fsupp (Xt+1)g ;max fsupp (Xt+1)g)
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If Xt+1 is a continuous random variable, this is implied by imposing  2 (0; 1) ;
CQFD. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
First, note that if ln (x)  N (; 2) then Q (x) = exp (+  1 ()) : This holds
since



















































where Rt+1 = Xt+1Pt :
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Substituting (6.48) into (6.49) and taking logs from both sides,
log ()  c   c 1 () + r + r 1 () = 0
Hence, since Et (rt+1) = r;
Et (rt+1) =   log () + c +  1 () (c   r)
For the risk-free rate, using (6.50) and (6.48) in the same way,








Proof of Proposition 4:
As in the proof of Proposition 3, we use the fact that if ln (x)  N (; 2) then
Q (x) = exp (+  1 ()) : Given that,











ln    c   t 1 () + r + 't 1 () = 0
and, since Et (rt+1) = r; we have
Et (rt+1) =   ln  + c + (   ')t 1 ()
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For the risk-free rate, using (6.50) and the conditional quantile for consumption
growth,








Proof of Proposition 5:
E























= ( 0   Pr ("c;t+1 < 0jFt))Zt
= 0; since Q0 ("c;t+1jFt) = 0:
Using the same steps, we also get
E
h










Proof of Proposition 6:
We verify the conditions of Theorem 2.6 of Newey and McFadden (1994) - NM







iid. However, as the authors point out on page 2133, the iid assumption may be replaced
by strictly stationarity and ergodicity. According to Proposition 3.44 in White (2001),
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to be strictly stationary and ergodic.
(NM 2.6.i) This is the condition that ensures global identification (see lemma 2.3 in
NM). However, if instead ofW0 being positive semi-definite one imposesW0 to be positive
definite, NF2.6.i can be trivially exchanged for E [g (Vt+1; )] = 0 if and only if  = 0: By
assumption (iv) W0 > 0 (a choice for WT that satisfies this will be provided): So, we have
to show that E [g (Vt+1; )] = 0 if and only if  = 0:
The fact that E [g (Vt+1; 0)] = 0 was already derived in the body of the text. We are
left to show that E [g (Vt+1; )] = 0)  = 0:





























= E [(    0)Zt] ; since Rft+1 2 Zt by assumption (vi)
= 0)  =  0; since 1 2 Zt by assumption (vi)











































=  0; since 1 2 Zt by assumption (vi)
By assumption (v), F(Ct+1=Ct)jZt is a continuous strictly increasing function within its






 0 jZt =  0:











which holds if either
(;  ) = (0;  0)
or
Rft+1 =
 0 log (0)   log ()
    0
at every t:
By assumption (vii), Rft+1 is a non-degenerate random variable. Hence,
(;  ) = (0;  0) a.s.
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Therefore, we conclude
E [g (Vt+1; )] = 0)  = 0 a.s.
(NM 2.6.ii) Assumption (iii) ensures 0 as an interior point of .
(NM 2.6.iii) This is satisfied because g (Vt+1; ) is discontinuous only when Ct+1Ct =
Rft+1
1=
and Rt+1 = Rft+1: By assumption (v), these two cases have probability zero.
(NM 2.6.iv) Note that since for any value of  we have





  kZtk   1 hRt+1 < Rft+1iZt  kZtk ;
we ensure E (sup2 kg (Vt+1; )k) <1 by assumption (ii).
Therefore, we conclude that b p! 0; by Theorem 2.6 of Newey and McFadden
(1994), CQFD. 




g (Vt+1; 0) g (Vt+1; 0)
0 :
Now, we prove that 0 is a positive definite matrix (since every positive definite
matrix is invertible and its inverse is also positive definite, we then are done:  10 exists
and is positive definite.) First, note that
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0 = E [E (At+1jZt)
 ZtZ 0t]
where At+1 is a 2 2 matrix with entries
A11 =










A12 = A21 =










( 0   1 [Rt+1 < Q0t (Rt+1)])
A22 = ( 0   1 [Rt+1 < Q0t (Rt+1)])2 ;
under the theoretical model.
We now compute E (A11jZt) ; E (A12jZt) ; E (A21jZt) and E (A22jZt) :
E (A11jZt) = E (A22jZt) =  20 (1   0) + ( 0   1)2  0 =  0 (1   0)
and
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E (A12jZt) = E (A21jZt)
= E












E [( 0   1 [Rt+1 < Q0t (Rt+1)]) jZt]
+Cov










;  0   1 [Rt+1 < Q0t (Rt+1)] jZt

= ( 0 (1   0) + ( 0   1)  0) ( 0 (1   0) + ( 0   1)  0)
+Cov








































= P ("c;t+1 < 0; "r;t+1 < 0jZt)  P ("c;t+1 < 0jZt)P ("r;t+1 < 0jZt)
= 't    20; for 't  P ("c;t+1 < 0; "r;t+1 < 0jZt) :
Therefore, E (At+1jZt) is positive definite if both the following conditions hold,
 0 (1   0) > 0
 20 (1   0)2  
 
't    20
2
> 0:
The first condition is ensured by assumption (viii). The second condition can be simplified
further,
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 20 (1   0)2 >
 
't    20
2
[ 0 (1   0)]2 >
 
't    20
2
 




't    20
2
 0    20 > 't    20
't <  0;
which is assumption (ix).
With respect to ZtZ 0t we can also show that it is positive definite. In fact, for any
 2 Rm;




holding with inequality only if Z 0t = 0: But, given assumption (x), Z 0t = 0 only if  = 0:
Therefore, since both E [At+1jZt] and ZtZ 0t are positive definite, E [At+1jZt] 
 ZtZ 0t is
positive definite and 0 is also positive definite, CQFD. 
Proof of Proposition 8:
First, an observation:
Even though g (Vt+1; ) is not differentiable in ; E [g (Vt+1; )] is. In fact, for





















@E [g1 (Vt+1; )] = E (Zt)


































































; for  = 0:


























; for  = 0:
@E [g2 (Vt+1; )] = E (Zt)
@E [g2 (Vt+1; )] = 0
@ E [g2 (Vt+1; )] = 0
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Given that, define G0 = rE [g (Vt+1; 0)] ; where rE [g (Vt+1; 0)] is the 2m  3
matrix derived above.
(end of observation)
We now check conditions (i) to (v) from Theorem 7.2 of Newey and McFadden
(1994) to establish the asymptotic normality of our estimator.
(NF.7.2.i) E [g (Vt+1; 0)] = 0 is shown in the body of the text.
(NF.7.2.ii) The fact that E [g (Vt+1; )] is differentiable at 0 was shown in the obser-
vation in the beginning of the proof. G00W0G0 is nonsingular by assumption (xii).
(NF.7.2.iii) Assumption (iii) ensures 0 as an interior point of .
(NF.7.2.iv) According to proposition 5 fg (Vt+1; 0) ;Ftg is a martingale difference
sequence. Given that, we check the conditions of Corollary 5.26 in White’s (2001). We
have





; where r > 2
 1 by assumption (ii’).





g (Vt+1; 0) g (Vt+1; 0)
0 p! 0;
where 0  E

g (Vt+1; 0) g (Vt+1; 0)
0 :









d! N (0;0) :
(NF.7.2.v) Andrews (1994) shows that empirical processes defined from moment
conditions as g (Vt+1; 0) are stochastically equicontinuous (g (Vt+1; 0) fits in what he calls
type I class of real functions - note that even though g1 (Vt+1; 0) has a nonlinear function
of the parameters inside the indicator function,









this can be written as,









given that the log is a strictly increasing function and Ct+1=Ct; ; Rft+1 > 0):
Therefore, by Theorem 7.2 of Newey and McFadden (1994), we conclude that
p
T
b   0 d! N 0; (G00W0G0) 1G00W00W0G00 (G00W0G0) 1 ;
CQFD. 
Lemma 1: Define  () = E







g (Vt+1; ) g (Vt+1; )
0 p!  () :
Proof of Lemma 1: First, note that g (Vt+1; ) is an F t+1 measurable function which
is strictly stationary and -mixing what implies that g (Vt+1; ) g (Vt+1; )0 is also strictly
stationary and -mixing of the same size (Theorem 3.49 of White (2001)).
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Now, all we need is to apply a Law of Large Numbers for -mixing sequences (Corol-
lary 3.48 of White (2001)). The conditions of White’s corollary are (a) g (Vt+1; ) g (Vt+1; )0	
has to be an -mixing sequence of size r= (r   1) ; r > 1 and (b)E g (Vt+1; ) g (Vt+1; )0r+ <
1 for some  > 0; where kk denotes the L1-norm: Condition (a) is directly satisfied by
assumption (i). For condition (b), note that
g (Vt+1; ) g (Vt+1; )0
 jgi0 (Vt+1; ) gj0 (Vt+1; )j ; where (i0; j0) = arg max
i1;jdim(g)
jgi (Vt+1; ) gj (Vt+1; )j
= jgi0 (Vt+1; ) jjgj0 (Vt+1; ) j
 C2 kg (Vt+1; )k2 ; by norm equivalence,for some positive constant C;
and hence
E
g (Vt+1; ) g (Vt+1; )0r+  C2 maxn1; E kg (Vt+1; )k2r+2o
by Cauchy-Schwarz. So, we would need some assumption such as "there exist some  > 0
such that E kg (Vt+1; )k2r+2 <1": However, note that





  kZtk   1 hRt+1 < Rft+1iZt  kZtk
and, therefore, it is enough to assume that there exist some  > 0 such that E kZtk2r+2 <
1; which is our assumption (ii’) CQFD. 
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Model estimation under lognormality
The solved model under lognormality and stochastic economic uncertainty is given
by










 1 ( 0) + '0tut+1 (6.52)







 1 ( 0) (6.53)
gt+1 = c + tt+1 (6.54)





in accordance to sub-section 1.3.2.
A possible estimator for the parameters is the simulated method of moments (SMM)
of McFadden (1986), Pakes and Pollard (1987), and Duffie and Singleton (1993), the last
one in the context of time-series as we have here.
Analogous to sub-section 1.3.2, we focus only on the estimation of 0 = (0;  0;  0) ;
fixing the dynamics parameters using the values in Table 1.1.
Definemt to be a p1 vector of empirical observations on variables whose moments
are of interest: the risk-free rate, the excess return, and the consumption growth. Such a
vector should contain the moments to be matched by the estimator. In our case, p = 6 and
mt =














Define mt () to be a p  1 vector with the synthetic counterpart of mt; whose ele-
ments are computed on the basis of artificial data generated by the model using parameter
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values : The number of observations in the artificial time series is given by T , where T
is the sample size and  is a positive integer:
The SMM estimator of 0 is defined as























where, to allow for a direct comparison with the simulation results from section 3.2, each
moment is equally weighted.
Under the regularity conditions of Duffie and Singleton (1993),
p
T
bSMM   0 d! N 0; (1 + 1=) (D00D0) 1D00
0D0 (D00D0) 1 ;
where,












T can be obtained by the Newey-West estimator. With respect to D0;
since there is no analytical solution for the differentiation; the derivatives are numerically
computed, and the expectation approximated by the average over the T simulated points.
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Under this framework, by drawing monthly observations, aggregating them to yearly,
and constructing mt from the same data used in section 1.4.3 (also yearly-aggregated), we
end up with the following estimates:
# of draws: 12 x 103 12 x 104 12 x 105
β 1.001 1.001 1.001
(se) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EIS 0.61 0.59 0.61
(se) (0.25) (0.17) (0.19)
τ 0.47 0.46 0.46
(se) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
As in the simulation exercise we assume that the decision interval of the agent is
monthly but the targeted data to match are annual. Therefore, we simulate at the monthly
frequency but match the yearly moments.
These results are in line with the calibrated values in section 1.3.2.
Appendix to Chapter 3
CAViaR Estimation Method
This is the Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) quasi-bayesian estimator.
Basically, to estimate f1; 2g in
Qrt+1 ( jIt) = X1 () + 2Qrt ( jIt 1) ;
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we draw a long series f1i; 2igSi=1 using MCMC (Metropolis-Hastings) from the pseudo
density function, the so-called quasi-posterior,
pn (1; 2) =
eLn(1;2) (1; 2)R
eLn(1;2) (1; 2) d1d2
; (6.56)
where  (1; 2) is a flat prior, Ln (1; 2) is a pseudo likelihood function,
Ln (1; 2) =  
NX
t=s




 (1  ) and  (u) = (   1 (u < 0))u: (6.58)












Because of the recursive specification in equation (3.43), one needs to compute initial
conditions to initialize equation (6.57). We set s = 100 and use the unconditional quantile
to evaluate Qr99 ( jI98) :
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Nonparametric Additive Model for Margins
To illustrate the idea underneath the estimation method suppose first that there is only
one explanatory variable, that is, mt = g(yt) + ut; where the only assumption about g is
smoothness. Then, to estimate g one can use some basis function with "good approxima-





where P  1 is an integer,  =  0; 1; :::; P+K0 is a vector of regression coefficients,
and B0 (y) ; :::; BP+K (y) is the basis: A common choice for the basis is the so-called cubic
spline, where K = 2,
Bj(y) = jy   jj3 ; for j = 1; :::; P
bP+1(y) = 1
bP+2(y) = y
and  = fj : j = 1; :::; Pg is a set of points in the range of y; called knots.
Defining xt =
 jyt   1j3 ; jyt   2j3 ; :::; jyt   P j3 ; 1; yt0 and X = (x1x2:::
xT ); we have
mt = X + u
where u = (u1; u2; :::; uT )
0
:
In principle, if P was chosen to be large enough to approximate g well, this model
could be fitted by minimizing u0u. However, if P is too large, the estimation is going
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to over-fit the data, that is, it will begin to fit the noise in the data, which will cause, in
the limit, the perfect interpolation of the data points. An option would be to choose P by
cross-validation methods, where the knots would be selected from a set of candidate knots
in a way similar to stepwise regression. However, as one can suspect, this can easily turn
out to be computationally too expensive.
A better solution is to use penalized splines (P-splines). O’Sullivan (1986, 1988) and
Eiders and Marx (1996) idea is to set P intentionally large (it can even be a knot at each
unique value of the support, which, in this case, would be called smoothing splines) and
control over-fitting by using least-squares estimation with a roughness penalty. The penalty






The first term in (6.60) is the traditional sum of the square of the residuals. The sec-
ond term is the roughness penalty, which increases as the cubic splines get rougher, that is,
when their slope change very rapidly – the integrated second derivative of the regression
function is a measure for it. Therefore,  defines the degree of smoothing: the larger , the
larger the smoothness of the estimator (the estimator’s bias increases and its variance de-
creases). For  = 0, one tends to the perfect interpolation of all data points as P increases;
by the other hand, for  ! 1, one has the linear least squares estimator. The advantage
of the P-splines is that now one has to choose a single parameter value to determine the
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smoothness of the estimator, in contrast to having to define the number and location of the
knots. Cross-validation is now computationally much cheaper.
It is important to note that object (6.60) is equal to u0u+ 0, where  is a matrix












+ 12 12    12  p2   22 + 2P 0 0
.
.





+ 1P 12  P2   22 + 2P    12 0 0
0 0    0 0 0
0 0    0 0 0
1CCCCCCA :
Minimizing (6.60), one gets the following closed-form estimator of g(y);
bg(y) = X (X 0X + ) 1X 0m (6.61)
where X and  were defined above and m = (m1;m2; :::;mT )0 :
The estimator in (6.61) was obtained for a single explanatory variable. It is straight-
forward to generalize it for the case of the complete model
mt = gv;0(V aRt) + :::+ gv;kv(V aRt kv) (6.62)
+gr;0(rt) + :::+ gr;kr(rt kr) + ut:






























where u = (u1+q; u2+q; :::; uT ) from equation (6.62) and q = max (kv; kr) :
Analogously to the univariate case, we approximate each unknown smooth function
in (6.63) using a cubic spline basis and, therefore, we can writemt = X+u and minimize
u0u with respect to :
